Ezeugo, R v Director of Legal Aid Casework

A judicial review claim is premature where the public authority has not yet made a decision capable of review. A request for further information to assess an application is not itself a refusal of the application. Judicial review may also be refused where an adequate statutory appeal remains available and has not been used.

The claimant sought interim relief and permission to bring judicial review proceedings concerning the proposed transfer of a civil legal aid certificate to new solicitors and an increase in the funding limit. The Director requested further information, including an analysis of the merits, and offered limited funding to obtain counsel’s opinion. The solicitors declined to continue without wider funding. The claimant alleged that the Director had refused the transfer and increase, and acted with hostile intent. The central issues were whether any reviewable public law decision had been made and whether the claim was premature given the statutory appeal route.

1. Claim dismissed. The Director had not decided to refuse either the transfer of the legal aid certificate or the requested increase in the costs limit. The only decision at that stage was the solicitors’ decision to decline to continue acting.
2. The Director was entitled, and obliged under the Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012, to seek further information before completing the assessment. In a special case involving substantial estimated costs, the Director could require a costed case plan identifying the proposed steps, key stages, required services, likely costs and review intervals under regulation 55(2).
3. Because no public law decision had been made, there was no decision capable of judicial review. The claim was therefore premature. The allegation of hostile intent did not require further investigation in the absence of a reviewable decision.
4. In any event, the claimant had an adequate alternative remedy. Regulation 44 of the Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012 provided a right of appeal to an Independent Funding Adjudicator. Although the appeal was normally required within 14 days, the Director was willing to waive that time limit.
5. The claim was entirely without foundation and was dismissed.