Proles v Kohli

For a domicile of choice, residence must be combined with an intention to reside permanently or indefinitely. The court determines that intention objectively by examining the person’s life as a whole, including residence, business, property, social and emotional connections, and conduct. Declarations of domicile are not conclusive and may receive little weight where they are self-serving or inconsistent with conduct. A domicile of choice is abandoned only when the person ceases both to reside in the country and to intend to reside there permanently or indefinitely. A temporary journey abroad does not abandon that domicile where the person intends to return. Nor does a later decision to remain abroad because terminal illness prevents a return, including a decision to die abroad.

This was the trial of a preliminary issue in a claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. Amélie Proles claimed against the estate of Baldev Kohli, whom she alleged was her father. The claim required the court to decide whether Mr Kohli was domiciled in England and Wales when he died.

His domicile of origin was India. The central questions were whether he had acquired England as his domicile of choice during his residence there and, if so, whether he abandoned it when he travelled to India shortly before his death.

1. Acquisition of domicile of choice. Residence alone was insufficient. The claimant had to establish residence in England together with an intention to reside there permanently or for an unlimited time. The relevant intention was inferred from the deceased’s conduct and circumstances as a whole.
2. The court considered the deceased’s extensive English business and property interests, his English bank accounts, professional relationships, social life, and emotional connections with his children, Amélie and Ms Proles. These factors showed that his business life and emotional centre of gravity had become firmly based in England. His continuing family and formal connections with India did not outweigh that conclusion.
3. Statements concerning domicile were of limited significance. The statements made to solicitors in 2014 were given little weight because they arose in a tax and succession context, were not based on a full investigation, and were inconsistent with other evidence. His later statement to Infields that he was domiciled and resident for tax purposes in the United Kingdom was also relevant.
4. The court concluded that the deceased acquired England as his domicile of choice by 2010.
5. Abandonment. The relevant date was when the deceased decided to travel to India, rather than the date of departure. The contemporaneous evidence showed that he intended to return to England. His English medical appointments, continuing business interests, English address in the will, proposed Richmond accommodation, and statements that he was travelling for rest and recuperation supported that conclusion.
6. A domicile of choice was not abandoned merely because illness later made a return impossible. Such a decision would be forced by illness and would not involve choosing where to live indefinitely. The same applied even if the deceased had travelled intending to die in India, since that would concern the place of death rather than the country in which he intended to live out his days.
7. The court therefore found that the deceased was domiciled in England at the date of his death.