Fitzgerald v Preston Crown Court & Anor

When reviewing a search warrant issued under Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 section 9 and Schedule 1, the High Court asks whether it was properly open to the issuing judge to find that the statutory conditions were satisfied. The judge need only have reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence had been committed; the offence need not have been committed by every suspect or by the occupier of the premises. The warrant may cover devices likely to contain relevant special procedure material, even where that material is not the principal target. Officers may exercise judgment when searching and sifting clearly specified articles. The Court will not intervene merely because an application was poorly drafted where the statutory requirements were met and no material prejudice resulted.

The claimant challenged warrants issued by HHJ Altham at Preston Crown Court under section 9 and Schedule 1 to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The warrants authorised searches of four domestic properties for electronic storage devices in a police investigation into an alleged conspiracy to pervert the course of justice connected with suspected corruption in local government.

The claim also challenged execution of the warrant, the claimant’s arrest, his continued detention, and an order concerning payment for a transcript. Following a rolled-up hearing, the Divisional Court considered whether permission for judicial review should be granted and whether any of the five grounds had merit.

1. Disposition. Permission to apply for judicial review was refused and the claim was dismissed. All five grounds failed.
2. The relevant approach was one of review. The Court would not intervene if it was properly open to HHJ Altham to be satisfied that the statutory requirements were met. Under Schedule 1 paragraph 2(a)(i), it was enough that there were reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence had been committed by someone. It was unnecessary to establish that every suspect, or the claimant, had committed the offence.
3. The material before HHJ Altham provided ample grounds for believing that a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice had been committed. A course of public justice had been embarked upon because investigations capable of bringing proceedings about were in progress. The evidence concerning the suspects’ communications and conduct also provided a sufficient basis for believing that the claimant himself might have participated. Possible innocent explanations did not prevent the statutory threshold from being met.
4. The police were entitled to use section 9 and Schedule 1 because the devices were very likely to contain special procedure material. The warrant sufficiently identified the articles to be searched. The fact that the application also sought evidence of offences, rather than special procedure material as its primary focus, did not invalidate the warrant. Any supposed requirement to proceed under section 8 would have produced no practical benefit and the section 9 procedure gave additional safeguards.
5. There were reasonable grounds for believing that the devices or their contents would be of substantial value and relevant evidential material. Specifying electronic devices did not impermissibly delegate the judicial function. Searching and sifting those devices necessarily involved officers exercising judgment as to relevance, within the limits of the warrant.
6. The risk of deletion, alteration or destruction of evidence justified the conclusion that other methods had been tried unsuccessfully or were bound to fail. A single application covering all four suspects was permissible, although the drafting was strongly criticised. The public interest requirement was also satisfied given the seriousness of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and the alleged concealment of significant fraud.
7. The execution challenge was arid. The warrant, Schedule 1 paragraph 13 and the additional seizure powers under the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 were compatible. The arrest and continued detention were objectively and subjectively justified on the police evidence, including the need to prevent collusion before interview. The transcript issue was academic.

The judgment records procedural orders by Dove J. transferring the rolled-up judicial review hearing to a Divisional Court in London. No lower judicial decision under appeal is identified. The Administrative Court refused permission for judicial review and dismissed the claim.