Wright v Satellite Information Services Ltd

Under section 57 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, failure to establish a head of personal injury damages does not, without more, establish fundamental dishonesty. The court must distinguish between evidence that is untruthful and evidence which, properly interpreted, does not support the amount or nature of the claim advanced. The first question is whether fundamental dishonesty is proved on the balance of probabilities. That question is primarily for the trial judge who heard the evidence. An appellate court should intervene only where a material flaw in the judge’s approach or analysis is identified. The presentation of a schedule of loss supported by a statement of truth is important, and lawyers must draft it so that the facts certified by the claimant are clear.

The defendant appealed against a decision of HHJ Pearce following a personal injury trial in the Chester County Court. Liability for the claimant’s workplace accident was admitted, but quantum and the defendant’s application under section 57 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 remained in issue. The trial judge awarded damages but rejected the allegation that the claimant had been dishonest, including in relation to a substantial claim for future care.

The defendant argued that rejection of the care claim required a finding of fundamental dishonesty. The central issue was whether the trial judge had been wrong in law, rather than merely in fact, not to make that finding.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The only issue was whether the trial judge had been wrong not to find, on the balance of probabilities, that the claimant had been fundamentally dishonest.
2. Section 57 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 requires the court first to decide whether fundamental dishonesty in relation to the primary claim or a related claim has been established. Only then does the question of substantial injustice under section 57(2) arise.
3. The failure to establish the bulk of a future care claim did not compel a finding of dishonesty. The trial judge had found that the claimant’s evidence, properly interpreted, did not support the care expert’s assessment. He had not found that the claimant’s evidence was untruthful.
4. The distinction from London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games v Sinfield [2018] EWHC 51 (QB) was material. In that case, the claimant had admitted manufacturing false invoices and the trial judge had found dishonesty. Here, the trial judge had made no such finding.
5. The applicable test of dishonesty was that stated in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd (t/a Crockfords) [2017] UKSC 67. In this context, dishonesty required no further elaboration. The issue was akin to a jury question and was primarily for the judge who had seen and heard the evidence.
6. No material flaw in the trial judge’s approach or analysis had been shown. The appeal was therefore an impermissible attempt to reopen findings of fact and was dismissed.

The court also emphasised that a schedule of loss supported by a statement of truth must clearly explain the claim. Lawyers must draft it so that the claimant understands, and certifies the truth of, the facts being advanced.

• High Court (Queen's Bench Division): appeal against the judgment of HHJ Pearce, handed down on 11 December 2017 after a three-day trial in Chester County Court. The appeal was dismissed.