Barker & Anor v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty To Animals

On an appeal by case stated concerning an animal-welfare disqualification order, the reviewing court should intervene only where the order is unlawful or falls clearly outside the broad area of the lower court’s sentencing discretion. A disqualification under section 34 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 is protective, not punitive. It may cover all animals where the offender’s treatment of one species reasonably informs the risk to others. The order must be framed by reference to animals generally or to kinds of animals, rather than individual animals. Its duration is fact-sensitive and may extend to life. The court upheld a seven-year prohibition, subject to an exception for terrapins, having regard to the animals’ conditions, the appellants’ lack of insight, the need for veterinary treatment and the protective purpose of the order.

The appellants pleaded guilty to two offences under section 9 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 concerning the failure to obtain veterinary treatment for one dog and to address a chronic flea infestation affecting five others. The magistrates imposed seven-year disqualification orders covering all animals and deprivation orders concerning the dogs, but no fine, community order, imprisonment or conditional discharge. The Crown Court dismissed the appeals, varying the disqualification to permit the keeping of terrapins.

The appellants appealed by case stated, arguing that the disqualification and deprivation orders were harsh, oppressive and disproportionate, and that the Crown Court had acted unreasonably and infringed article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The issues were whether the case stated appeal could overcome the high threshold for intervention and whether the scope and duration of the protective order were lawful.

1. Extension of time. Time was extended by a few days because the respondents suffered no prejudice and refusal would prejudice the appellants, although the failure to comply with the time limit was unjustified.
2. Standard of review. An appeal by case stated is not an ordinary appeal against sentence. The court may intervene only where the lower court acted unlawfully or the order falls clearly outside the broad area of its sentencing discretion. The approach reflected R. v. Truro Crown Court ex p. RD [1997] EWHC Admin 135, which provided a more objective formulation than whether an order was truly astonishing.
3. Scope of section 34. A disqualification may cover all animals, specified kinds of animals, or all animals subject to an exception for specified kinds. Section 34(5) does not permit prohibition by reference to individual animals. An all-animals order is lawful in principle because treatment of one species may illuminate the likely treatment of another.
4. Protective purpose. Disqualification is a protective measure imposed in the public interest, not a punishment. The court must make a fact-sensitive assessment of the need for protection and the appropriate period. The absence of a separate criminal penalty does not itself make a long disqualification unreasonable.
5. Application. The Crown Court was entitled to rely on the extreme squalor, the confinement and heavy flea infestation of the dogs, the appellants’ lack of insight, and the failure to obtain necessary treatment for Lilly. The later remedial steps did not compel confidence in future animal care. The balancing exercise was measured and fair, and the seven-year order was not arbitrary, excessively long or contrary to article 8.
6. The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 did not assist the appellants. If the disqualification period was reasonable, the resulting rehabilitation period followed Parliament’s scheme and did not logically affect the reasonableness of the order. The appeal was dismissed.

• Crown Court at Hull: dismissed the appeals against sentence on 27 October 2016, varying the section 34 order to permit the appellants to keep terrapins.
• High Court (Administrative Court): extended time and dismissed the appeal by case stated, subject to correcting the scope of the terrapin exception so that it applied to terrapins generally rather than one identified animal.