Torridge District Council v. Caswell

An Employment Tribunal extending time for an unfair-dismissal complaint must address whether presentation within the primary period was not reasonably practicable and, separately, whether the ensuing period was reasonable. The latter inquiry is objective and requires analysis of the causes and periods of delay.

When extending time for discrimination claims on a just-and-equitable basis, the Tribunal must give adequate reasons for its conclusions on the delay, its causes and material evidence. A general finding that mental ill health primarily caused delay will not suffice where material challenges to credibility, the absence of medical evidence, and later periods of delay have not been addressed.

The claimant, an animal welfare officer, was dismissed in July 2015. He presented claims for unfair dismissal, direct disability discrimination and failure to make reasonable adjustments in December 2016, more than 16 months after dismissal.

The Employment Tribunal held that it had not been reasonably practicable to present the unfair-dismissal complaint in time under section 111 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. It also extended time for the discrimination claims under section 123 of the Equality Act 2010. The Council appealed, alleging inadequate reasons, perversity and error in extending time without medical evidence.

The central issue was whether the Tribunal had adequately explained its findings on the claimant's mental health and the successive periods of delay.

1. Appeal allowed. The Tribunal's decisions extending time for both the unfair-dismissal and discrimination claims were inadequately reasoned and could not stand.

2. For the unfair-dismissal complaint, section 111 required separate consideration of whether timely presentation was not reasonably practicable and whether the claim was then presented within a reasonable further period. The second inquiry is objective. It requires analysis of the causes of delay and of the period reasonably allowed in those circumstances, bearing in mind the public interest in prompt presentation of employment claims.

3. The Tribunal had found that the claimant's mental health was an insurmountable barrier until June 2016, but did not explain why, after that date and particularly after 30 August 2016, he remained unable to present a claim without assistance. It did not address why engagement with ACAS in October 2016 did not permit presentation before December.

4. The reasons also failed to engage with material challenges made in cross-examination, including social-media evidence bearing on credibility, and with the absence of evidence properly describable as medical evidence. Those matters were material because the Tribunal was substantially reliant on the claimant's account of his mental condition over a prolonged period.

5. The same deficiencies affected the just-and-equitable extension under section 123 of the Equality Act 2010. A bare conclusion that delay was primarily caused by mental ill health did not satisfy the duty to state the basic factual conclusions and reasons sufficiently to show why the parties had won or lost.

6. The case was remitted for a rehearing before a differently constituted Employment Tribunal. The Appeal Tribunal indicated that proper medical evidence, and relevant initial communications from the Bar Pro Bono Unit and ACAS concerning time limits, should be obtained for the rehearing.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: allowed the Council's appeal and remitted the extension-of-time issues for rehearing before a different Employment Tribunal.
• Employment Tribunal: Employment Judge Matthews held that time should be extended for the unfair-dismissal complaint under section 111 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and for the discrimination claims under section 123 of the Equality Act 2010.