Sagicor Bank Jamaica Limited v Taylor-Wright

Summary judgment does not require the court to try every disputed fact. A trial is necessary only where resolving the dispute could affect the claimant’s entitlement to the relief sought. If the claimant would be entitled to relief even assuming the defendant’s factual case were proved, the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim or issue.

On an application, the court may consider the claim form, particulars, reply and evidence properly before it. A claim for repayment of a loan is not confined to a promissory note where the wider pleadings and documents establish the borrowing and repayment obligation. A forgery issue concerning the note may therefore be immaterial.

Sagicor Bank Jamaica Limited claimed repayment of a demand loan from Taylor-Wright. The claim relied on a promissory note which Taylor-Wright alleged was forged, although she admitted borrowing the money and had executed mortgages and other loan documentation.

Sykes J granted summary judgment. The Court of Appeal of Jamaica reversed, holding that the forgery issue required a trial and that the claim was based entirely on the note. The issue before the Privy Council was whether the wider pleadings and evidence showed an enforceable loan debt, such that the forgery dispute and proposed alternative defences did not affect the Bank’s entitlement to judgment.

Appeal allowed. The Board advised that the judgment of Sykes J be restored.

1. Summary judgment. The purpose of Part 15 of the Supreme Court of Jamaica Civil Procedure Rules 2002 is to avoid a trial where trial is unnecessary. Disputed facts may require oral evidence, but only where their resolution could affect the claimant’s entitlement to the relief sought. If the claimant would be entitled to relief whether the claimant’s account or the defendant’s account were proved, the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim or issue under Part 15.2.
2. Identification of the claim. The court is primarily guided by the statements of case, but it is not confined to the Particulars of Claim alone. The Claim Form and Reply could properly be considered under Part 8.9. The evidence filed on the applications could also be considered. Read in that way, the Bank’s claim included repayment of a loan debt, not merely enforcement of the promissory note. The mortgages, commitment letter, Note 2, admission of the borrowing and unchallenged account evidence supported that conclusion.
3. Forgery and alternative defences. If the claim had depended solely on the Note, the forgery allegation would have required a trial. It did not do so here. There was no identified Jamaican rule requiring all lending terms to appear in one document, and the commitment letter contained the relevant terms. The alleged forgery could not taint repayment of a substantially unpaid borrowing where Taylor-Wright accepted that she had signed Note 2 in identical terms. The ex turpi causa defence therefore failed, and the limitation defence was hopeless because the loan claim was brought within six years of the last part payment, or was revived by acknowledgments in the Defence.
4. Procedure and amount. A defendant resisting summary judgment must disclose available defences rather than reserve them. The judgment amount could include accrued interest and fees supported by unchallenged evidence. The trial would have been a serious waste of time and expense.

• Privy Council: allowed the appeal and advised restoration of Sykes J’s judgment. The Board’s provisional view was that the Bank should recover its costs of the appeal and the court below.
• Court of Appeal of Jamaica: reversed the summary judgment, holding that the forgery issue required a trial and that the claim was based entirely on the promissory note.
• Supreme Court of Jamaica: Sykes J granted the Bank summary judgment for the updated amount claimed.