Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police

The police do not enjoy a general immunity from negligence claims, but ordinary negligence principles apply: where police positive conduct foreseeably and directly causes physical injury, a duty of care arises and will be imposed as it would be on any other actor; by contrast, absent special circumstances the common-law rule against liability for pure omissions means there is no general duty to protect individuals from harm caused by third parties.

The appellant, an elderly passer-by, was injured when police officers attempting to arrest a suspect struggled with him on a public pavement and all fell, with the claimant underneath. The Recorder found negligence but held police immunity applied; the Court of Appeal found no duty of care and, alternatively, no breach. The Supreme Court considered whether established negligence principles or a universal application of the Caparo tripartite test govern duty, the scope of any police immunity (including the distinction between acts and omissions), and whether the officers owed and breached a duty to the claimant. The court allowed the appeal and remitted the case for assessment of damages.

Disposition: The appeal is allowed. The Chief Constable is liable in damages to the claimant; the case is remitted for assessment of damages (see para 81).

(1) Caparo and approach to duty: The existence of a duty of care does not depend on a rigid application of a tripartite "Caparo test" in every case; rather the law proceeds incrementally by analogy with established categories and precedent. Caparo is to be read as endorsing incremental development, not as a universal three-stage mechanical test (paras 21-30).

(2) Public authorities and omissions: Public authorities are generally subject to ordinary tortious liability where the conduct would be tortious for a private person, but the common-law reluctance to impose liability for pure omissions remains important. The police, like others, are not usually under a duty to prevent harm caused by third parties absent special circumstances (assumption of responsibility, creation of danger, special control/status) (paras 31-41, 34-37, 70).

(3) Police liability in particular: Hill does not establish a blanket immunity for police acts; it confirmed that police may be liable for positive acts causing personal injury in accordance with ordinary tort principles. However, a rule that the police owe no private-law duty to protect potential victims from third-party criminal acts remains sound absent special circumstances; policy considerations bear on novel extensions of liability (paras 43-56, 70).

(4) Act versus omission in this case: The claimant's injury resulted from the police officers' positive conduct in instigating an arrest which foreseeably led to a tussle and the injury. This is a case of positive act, not a pure omission; liability for positive negligent acts causing physical injury falls within an established category (paras 72-73).

(5) Duty, breach and causation on the facts: Given the officers foresaw the suspect might resist and that pedestrians were passing closely, it was reasonably foreseeable that attempting the arrest at that moment created a risk to vulnerable pedestrians. That foreseeable risk sufficed to impose a duty of care to those in the immediate vicinity (para 74). The Recorder was entitled to find negligence because the arresting officer had failed to observe and take care for the safety of a nearby elderly passer-by in circumstances in which he accepted he would have delayed the arrest if he had perceived someone to be in harm's way (paras 75-78). Causation is established: the claimant was injured by the very danger the officers had a duty to guard against and the suspect's subsequent resistance was not a novus actus (paras 79-80).

(6) Practical guidance: Courts should apply established categories where appropriate, weigh policy only when recognising novel duties, and distinguish between negligent positive acts (liable) and omissions to protect against third-party wrongdoing (generally not liable absent special circumstances) (paras 21-30, 31-41, 70, 81).

• Court of Appeal: [2014] EWCA Civ 15 – held that no duty of care was owed and in any event no breach; judgment in favour of respondent (as summarised in this judgment).
• Recorder (trial judge): not separately reported in this judgment – found negligence but held police immunity applied; trial judgment reversed by the Court of Appeal and restored by this Court (see paras 8-15 and paras 77-81).