Robinson v West Yorkshire Police

The three-stage Caparo test—foreseeability, proximity, and whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty—applies to negligence claims involving direct physical harm as well as other harm. The Hill principle is not a blanket immunity, but most claims arising from the police’s core functions of investigating and suppressing crime and apprehending offenders will fail at the fairness stage. Effective policing and public safety may outweigh an individual claim. Exceptions may include non-core operational activities, an assumption of responsibility, and cases at the margins involving exceptionally reckless conduct. Mere physical proximity to an arrest and a foreseeable risk do not establish proximity in law. Police operational decisions must be assessed without hindsight.

The appellant was injured when a drug dealer resisted arrest and the struggle carried her to the ground. She sued the Chief Constable in negligence. The trial judge found foreseeable risk, proximity, a duty of care and breach, but dismissed the claim on the basis of the police public-policy principle associated with Hill. The appellant appealed the dismissal. The respondent challenged the findings of duty and negligence while supporting the outcome. The central issues were whether the Caparo test applied to direct physical harm, whether the police principle barred the claim, and whether the findings of duty, proximity and breach were sustainable.

1. Appeal dismissed. Lady Justice Hallett, with Lord Justice Sullivan agreeing, held that the claim failed in duty and fairness. Mr Justice Arnold agreed and gave additional reasons.
2. The three-stage test in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 applies throughout the modern law of negligence, including claims for direct physical harm. Foreseeability, proximity and whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty remain relevant whatever the nature of the harm. The approach is consistent with the reasoning in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 and the analysis in Marc Rich & Co. AG v Bishop Rock Marine [1996] 1 AC 211.
3. The core principle in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] 1 AC 53, as reaffirmed in Brooks v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2005] UKHL 24 and Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire [2009] 1 AC 225, remains applicable. Most negligence claims arising from the police’s core functions of investigating and suppressing crime and apprehending offenders will fail at the fair, just and reasonable stage, because a duty may encourage defensive policing and undermine public protection. The distinction between direct and indirect harm does not determine the result.
4. The principle is not a blanket immunity. Possible exceptions include activities outside core police functions, an assumption of responsibility to an individual, and cases at the margins involving exceptionally reckless operations. No definitive list was appropriate. On these facts, the harm was caused by the offender’s resistance, and the police had not assumed responsibility to the appellant. Her physical presence and the foreseeable risk were insufficient to establish legal proximity, which requires a relationship beyond that owed to the public generally.
5. In any event, the evidence did not establish negligence. Police operational decisions must be judged by the standard of reasonably competent police officers and without hindsight. The Recorder’s criticisms of the arrest plan and the three-second delay before supporting officers arrived were not sufficient to establish breach. The findings of duty and breach were therefore unsustainable.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [2014] EWCA Civ 15 dismissed the appeal and held that the findings of duty and breach could not stand.
• Huddersfield County Court: Mr Recorder Pimm found negligence but dismissed the claim on the basis of the police public-policy principle.