Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire

Foreseeability of harm does not by itself establish a duty of care. A further ingredient must create sufficient proximity between the parties.

The police owe the public a general duty to enforce the criminal law. They do not ordinarily owe an individual duty to identify and apprehend an offender where the claimant faces only the general risk shared by a large section of the public. A duty may arise where the police directly cause injury or a special relationship exposes an individual to a distinctive risk.

Public policy also precludes negligence claims challenging the operational conduct of criminal investigations. Such liability could encourage defensive policing, intrude upon discretionary decisions and divert resources from crime prevention.

Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire concerned a negligence claim by the mother and personal representative of the final victim of a serial murderer. She alleged that failures by the West Yorkshire police to collate and assess information delayed the identification and arrest of the murderer.

The Chief Constable was sued under section 48(1) of the Police Act 1964. On an application under the Rules of the Supreme Court, Ord. 18, r. 19, the pleaded facts and causation were assumed to be true. Sir Neil Lawson struck out the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. The Court of Appeal affirmed that decision in [1988] Q.B. 60.

The central issue was whether police officers investigating and suppressing crime owed individual members of the public a duty of care in respect of harm subsequently inflicted by a criminal whom they had negligently failed to identify and apprehend.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Keith of Kinkel delivered the leading speech. Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton and Lord Goff of Chieveley expressly agreed with his reasons. The order striking out the claim was affirmed.

2. Per Lord Keith, foreseeability of likely harm was insufficient to establish negligence liability. A further ingredient was required to create the necessary proximity. Although police officers owed the public a common-law duty to enforce the criminal law, Reg. v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 Q.B. 118 showed that chief officers possessed wide discretion over inquiries, prosecutions and the deployment of resources. That general public duty did not readily support an individual private-law duty.

3. The proximity present in Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office [1970] AC 1004 was absent. In that case, custodians had brought escape-prone detainees into a locality where nearby yacht owners faced a distinctive and exceptional risk during an escape. The murderer in the present case had never been in police custody, and the victim was one of a large class exposed to the general risk arising from his criminal activities. Being young and female did not place her at a sufficiently special risk.

   If no general duty was owed to prevent the escape of a known criminal or to recapture him before he resumed his criminal career, no corresponding duty could be imposed to discover the identity of and apprehend an unknown criminal. The circumstances therefore could not establish a duty of care owed to the deceased.

4. Per Lord Keith, public policy supplied a separate and independent ground for rejecting liability. Negligence actions concerning criminal investigations could promote defensive policing and require courts to examine discretionary choices about lines of inquiry and resource allocation. Defending such actions would divert police manpower, attention and expense from the suppression of crime. The police were therefore immune from an action of this kind on grounds analogous to those supporting the barrister's immunity considered in Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 A.C. 191.

5. The decision did not confer a general immunity from tort liability. Per Lord Keith, a police officer could remain liable where injury resulted directly from the officer's acts or omissions, including negligence, assault, unlawful arrest, wrongful imprisonment or malicious prosecution.

6. Lord Templeman agreed that the appeal should be dismissed. In a separate speech, he emphasised that a damages action was not an appropriate means of investigating the overall efficiency of a police force. Such litigation would distract officers from their duties and could not address systemic matters such as training, organisation, staffing or resources.

1. House of Lords: The appeal was dismissed unanimously and the Court of Appeal's order was affirmed: [1989] AC 53.
2. Court of Appeal: Fox and Glidewell L.JJ. and Sir Roualeyn Cumming-Bruce affirmed the order striking out the statement of claim: [1988] Q.B. 60.
3. High Court: Sir Neil Lawson granted the Chief Constable's application under the Rules of the Supreme Court, Ord. 18, r. 19 and struck out the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.