Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office (Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd)

A person entrusted with the custody and control of another may owe a duty to protect nearby property from that person where the relationship creates a special responsibility and the risk of damage is obvious and likely. A deliberate or criminal intervening act does not necessarily break causation when it is the very kind of conduct likely to result from the defendant’s negligence.

The statutory character of a custodial function creates no blanket immunity. A genuine exercise of statutory policy discretion is distinct from operational neglect or conduct outside delegated authority. Rehabilitative objectives may affect the content and standard of care, but they do not automatically exclude a duty to persons exposed to an exceptional and proximate risk.

Seven Borstal trainees escaped from Brownsea Island after the three officers responsible for them allegedly retired to bed without maintaining any effective watch or control. The trainees took a nearby yacht, collided with the claimant company’s moored yacht and subsequently caused further damage to it.

The company claimed that the officers had negligently failed to supervise and control the trainees. The Home Office accepted that it would be vicariously liable if the officers were liable. Before any facts were tried, a preliminary issue asked whether the pleaded circumstances were capable of giving rise to a duty of care owed to the company.

The Home Office appealed from the Court of Appeal’s affirmative answer. The central issue was whether custodians could owe a common-law duty to owners of nearby property foreseeably endangered by trainees escaping from their control.

1. Disposition. By a majority of four to one, the House dismissed the Home Office’s appeal. The pleaded facts were capable of establishing a duty of care. The action could therefore proceed to trial, where breach, causation and recoverable damage remained to be proved.
2. Duty arising from control and proximity. Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest and Lord Pearson held that the officers’ control over the trainees, together with the obvious danger to readily accessible nearby yachts, created a sufficient relationship for a duty of reasonable care. The principle stated in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 applied, although it was a general principle rather than a statutory definition or universal formula. The duty was not a guarantee against escape or damage. Its content depended on the circumstances, including the legitimate requirements of Borstal training.
3. Intervening criminal conduct. Lord Reid held that liability was for the officers’ own carelessness, not vicarious responsibility for the trainees. Deliberate human conduct does not invariably break the chain of causation. Where the intervening conduct is the very kind of event likely to result from the original negligence, it may remain a consequence of that negligence. On the assumed facts, taking a boat and damaging another vessel were likely consequences of an escape from the island.
4. Statutory functions and discretion. Lord Reid, Lord Morris and Lord Pearson held that performance of a statutory function did not by itself exclude a common-law duty. A genuine and careful exercise of a policy discretion could not be converted into negligence merely because unfortunate consequences followed. Operational neglect, failure to obey instructions or conduct so unreasonable that it did not constitute a real exercise of discretion stood differently. The rehabilitative purpose of the Prison Act 1952 affected the appropriate standard of care but afforded no general immunity.
5. Lord Diplock’s narrower reasoning. Lord Diplock agreed that the appeal should be dismissed. He considered that liability required proof that the officers acted outside their instructions or any bona fide delegated discretion. It also required reasonable foreseeability that these trainees would appropriate and damage property near the place of detention while evading immediate pursuit. The pleadings were capable of satisfying both conditions, but their truth had to be determined at trial.
6. Dissent. Lord Dilhorne would have allowed the appeal. In his view, reasonable foreseeability identified potential beneficiaries of a duty but could not itself create a previously unrecognised duty. The proposed extension was too broad and should be made by Parliament rather than the courts.

• House of Lords: By a majority of four to one, dismissed the Home Office’s appeal and held that the pleaded facts were capable of establishing a duty of care. The decision is reported at [1970] AC 1004.
• Court of Appeal: Decided the preliminary issue in the company’s favour. Lord Denning MR treated the existence of the proposed duty as a question of judicial policy. The full citation is not stated in the judgment.
• First instance: A preliminary issue was ordered before trial to determine whether the pleaded facts were capable of giving rise to a duty of care. No findings of fact had yet been made, and the citation and formal order are not stated.