Tindall and another v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police

The court affirms that the ordinary rule in negligence distinguishes acts that make matters worse from omissions to confer a benefit: public authorities (including the police) do not owe a general duty to protect individuals from dangers they did not create, but will be liable where their intervention makes the position worse. A duty based on displacing another rescuer arises only where the defendant knew or ought to have known their conduct would foreseeably prevent that rescuer from protecting others.

The claim concerned a fatal road collision allegedly made more likely by an earlier police response to a separate accident on the same icy stretch of road. The estate of the deceased sued the Chief Constable alleging the police attendance displaced a potential rescuer and/or otherwise created or relinquished control of the hazard. The claim was struck out by the Court of Appeal, and the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. The question before the court was whether, as a matter of law on the pleaded facts, the police owed a duty of care by virtue of making matters worse or under recognised exceptions (assumption of responsibility, control, or status).

The Supreme Court examined authority on omissions and rescue liability, summarised the governing principles, considered the so‑called "interference" principle, and assessed whether the pleaded facts disclosed that the police knew or ought to have known they would displace another's protective efforts. The court concluded there was no duty of care on the facts and dismissed the appeal.

Overall disposition: The appeal is dismissed.

1. Legal framework. The court restates the fundamental distinction in negligence between making matters worse (positive acts causing additional harm) and failing to confer a benefit (omissions), applying the same principles to public authorities as to private individuals. Exceptions where a duty to protect may arise include control of a third party, an assumption of responsibility, and where defendant's conduct foreseeably displaces another's rescue.
2. Interference principle. The court accepts the "interference" or displacement formulation as a correct statement of the law: a defendant who acts in a way that foreseeably prevents another from protecting the claimant can, by making matters worse, owe a duty, provided the defendant knew or ought reasonably to have known of that effect. The test requires knowledge or reasonable foreseeability that the defendant's conduct would put off or prevent the other person from acting (paras 56, 58, 59).
3. Application to the pleaded facts.
   1. The pleaded facts are assumed true for present purposes, including that but for police attendance Mr Kendall would have continued efforts to warn motorists and that the police presence caused him to desist (paras 17, 46, 60).
   2. However, the claimant must also plead and prove that the police knew or ought to have known about Mr Kendall's role as a likely rescuer or that their presence would displace his efforts. On the pleaded and evidential material there is no basis for inferring that knowledge or reasonable foreseeability (paras 62–66, 70).
   3. Because the necessary foreseeability element is absent and there is no evidence that the police took control of the hazard itself, the interference argument fails (paras 62, 68–70).
4. Control, assumption of responsibility and status. The court reviews the exceptions. Assumption of responsibility cannot be made out because there was no promise or assurance on which relevant road users relied (paras 75–77). The control argument fails because the police did not take control of the source of danger (the patch of ice) and mere attendance or temporary use of lights/signs does not convert an ineffectual response into a duty (paras 78–84). The proposed "status" exception for the police is incompatible with settled authority in Michael and is not advanced successfully (paras 85–87).
5. Prejudice and procedural disposal. Given the settled state of the law and the absence of realistic prospect of adducing relevant new evidence after extensive investigations and proceedings, it would be unjust and a misuse of resources to allow the claim to proceed to trial; the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the claim was correct (paras 68–70).
6. Order. The appeal is dismissed. The application for leave to file a post‑hearing note was refused (paras 88–89).

• High Court (King's Bench Division, QBD): Master McCloud refused strike‑out/summary judgment ([2020] EWHC 837 (QB); [2021] RTR 6) (claim allowed to proceed at first instance).
• Court of Appeal: Allowed the defendant's appeal and struck out the claim ([2022] EWCA Civ 25; [2022] 4 WLR 104).
• Supreme Court: Appeal dismissed ([2024] UKSC 33) (this judgment).