Rathband v Northumbria Constabulary

A Chief Constable ordinarily owes officers a non-delegable duty to provide and operate a safe system of work. That duty may nevertheless be excluded by public policy where the alleged negligence concerns an operational decision forming part of the investigation or prevention of crime, taken under pressure and carrying a risk of defensive policing. The character of the decision, rather than the alleged seriousness of the negligence, is decisive. In such circumstances the Hill principle may outweigh the quasi-employer duty. Even if a duty exists, the court must assess breach without hindsight, balancing officer safety against the effect of an immediate warning on public protection and police operations. A warning will not establish causation unless it is more likely than not that it would have changed the officer’s conduct in time to prevent the injury.

PC David Rathband was shot and blinded by Raoul Moat while on patrol. The claim, continued after his death by his brother and sister on behalf of his dependants and estate, alleged that the Chief Constable was liable for failing to issue an immediate warning after Moat made a threatening 999 call.

The trial concerned liability only. The central issues were whether the Chief Constable owed a private law duty of care to an officer in circumstances involving an urgent operational decision during a murder investigation; whether Superintendent Farrell’s decision to await further telephone and cell-site analysis was negligent; and whether an earlier warning would probably have prevented the shooting.

1. Duty of care. The starting point was that a Chief Constable owed officers a non-delegable duty to take reasonable care for their safety by providing and operating a safe system of work. That duty was subject to public policy considerations.
2. The Hill principle applied to operational decisions concerning the investigation and prevention of crime. The decision whether to issue an immediate warning to about 700 officers, while seeking further information about the threat and Moat’s location, was taken under acute time pressure, involved competing public-safety considerations and carried a real risk of defensive policing. It was therefore not fair, just and reasonable to impose a private law duty in respect of that decision. The claim consequently failed in negligence.
3. Breach. If a duty had existed, Superintendent Farrell’s decision to await imminent cell-site analysis and an initial analysis of the call was a reasonable exercise of judgment. The reported information was incomplete and second- or third-hand. An immediate warning could have disrupted communications and impaired the police response to other emergencies. The decision required careful, rapid evaluation and was not a no-brainer. The court assessed it without hindsight.
4. Causation. Any warning could have been issued only after allowing time for decision-making and broadcasting. At most about three and a half minutes were available, leaving PC Rathband no more than seconds to react. A general warning to remain vigilant, even with an indication that Moat might be in the Charlie 6 area, would probably not have caused him to leave his position immediately. Nor would additional vigilance probably have enabled him to evade an attack which unfolded within seconds.
5. The alternative allegation that earlier briefing should have led to double-crewing also failed. Before the 999 call there was no information indicating that Moat was hunting police officers, and double-crewing would have reduced available patrol coverage. The claim was dismissed.