Curtis (A.K.A Jason) Davis v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

In a civil claim arising from a police shooting, self-defence requires the defendant to prove that the officer honestly and reasonably believed that he faced imminent physical violence. Reasonableness is assessed objectively, but in the circumstances confronting the officer, including the very limited time available for decision-making. A mistaken belief may be reasonable. The police generally owe no duty of care concerning the planning, briefing or conduct of crime-prevention operations, absent an assumption of responsibility or an exceptional case. Article 2 requires assessment of both the force used and the planning and control of the operation.

The claimant was shot by an armed Metropolitan Police officer during an attempted stop of two vehicles. The officer believed that the claimant, who was in the front passenger seat, was pointing a gun at him. The object was a jump-lead handle, and the claimant was unarmed.

The claimant sued the Commissioner for battery, negligence concerning the operation and its briefings, and breach of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The issues were whether the shooting was protected by self-defence, whether the police owed a relevant duty of care, and whether errors in planning, briefing or intelligence materially contributed to the shooting or breached Article 2.

1. Battery. The Commissioner bore the civil burden of establishing self-defence. The officer honestly believed that he was about to be shot, and that belief was reasonable. The resemblance between the jump-lead handle and a pistol, the poor lighting, the intelligence that the claimant possessed a firearm and the officer’s need to decide within seconds supported that conclusion. The single shot was proportionate to the perceived imminent lethal danger. The battery claim was dismissed.
2. The reasonableness of the belief was assessed objectively, but with all the circumstances in mind. The court avoided hindsight and took account of the short time available to make the assessment. The officer was entitled to rely on operational intelligence which his commanders had treated as sufficiently reliable. The mistaken briefing about the claimant’s 2003 offences was negligent, but it did not materially affect the officer’s assessment because the accurate history still supported the view that the claimant was dangerous.
3. Negligence. Applying Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 465 and the core principle in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] 1 AC 53, the police owed no relevant duty of care concerning the planning and briefing of the operation. Direct physical harm did not alter that conclusion. There was no assumption of responsibility and no exceptional negligence of the kind considered in Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 1 WLR 1242. In any event, the identified errors did not materially contribute to the shooting.
4. Article 2. Article 2 was engaged because potentially life-threatening force had been used, although the claimant survived. The shooting did not breach Article 2 because the officer honestly and reasonably believed that the force was absolutely necessary in defence against unlawful violence. The planning and conduct of the operation also did not breach Article 2. The Osman duty concerned threats from third parties and was not applicable to force used by a police officer in an authorised operation.
5. The claim as a whole was dismissed.