Raissi & Anor v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

For an arrest under Terrorism Act 2000, the officer must genuinely suspect that the person is a terrorist and must have reasonable grounds for that suspicion. The objective assessment is confined to the information actually in the arresting officer’s mind at the time. Officers may rely on information supplied through a police briefing and may act in difficult operational circumstances, but they cannot justify arrest by assuming that a superior possesses undisclosed material. Family relationship, proximity and access to another person’s home do not by themselves establish reasonable grounds. A separate necessity defence cannot assist where the detainee was arrested and informed only on the statutory terrorism-suspicion ground.

The claimants sought damages for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment after their arrests on 21 September 2001 under section 41(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000. They were the wife and brother of Lotfi Raissi, who was suspected of involvement in the 11 September 2001 attacks. Neither claimant was charged.

The subjective suspicion of the arresting officers and the exercise of their discretion were accepted as genuine and rational. The principal issue was whether the information in each officer’s mind supplied objectively reasonable grounds for suspecting the relevant claimant to be a terrorist. The Commissioner also advanced necessity as an alternative defence.

1. Mrs Sonia Raissi. Her arrest was justified. The arresting officer knew that she had lived with Lotfi Raissi in Phoenix while he underwent flight training at the same time and place as a known perpetrator, and knew of their joint bank account and financial links. The circumstances placed her materially closer to the suspected activity than a person connected only by family or domestic relationship.
2. Mr Mohamed Raissi. His arrest was unlawful. The grounds were that he was the close brother of a major suspect, lived relatively near him, and had access to his home. The officer’s general belief that family links were significant in terrorism cases did not supply sufficient substance. Good faith and compliance with senior instructions did not provide a defence.
3. Applying O’Hara v Chief Constable of the RUC [1997] AC 286, the relevant material was what each arresting officer knew or had been told at the time. Police officers may work as a team and rely on briefings, but the officer exercising the statutory power must possess sufficient information to have reasonable cause for suspicion. It was immaterial that a superior might have had undisclosed intelligence. The threshold is lower than prima facie proof, although the grounds must still be objectively reasonable.
4. The court accepted that operational urgency may be considered when judging reasonableness. It did not need to decide the general availability of necessity in wrongful-arrest cases. In any event, neither claimant had been told that necessity was the ground of arrest; each had been told only that the arrest was for suspected terrorist involvement. Necessity therefore could not justify these arrests.
5. Mrs Sonia’s claim was dismissed. Judgment was entered for Mr Mohamed, with damages to be assessed.