Reynolds v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis

A warrantless arrest requires reasonable grounds for suspecting that the arrested person is guilty of an arrestable offence. Prima facie evidence is unnecessary, but mere association with a suspect, employment as a company secretary and a visit to relevant premises may be insufficient.

Damages for false imprisonment compensate loss of liberty and resulting reputational damage. Conduct during detention is ordinarily part of the complaint rather than a separate head of aggravation. An appellate court should not substitute its own assessment for a jury’s unless no reasonable jury could have reached the award.

The police were investigating suspected deliberately caused fires and related insurance fraud. Mrs Reynolds, who lived with Mr Reynolds and had connections with a company associated with him, was arrested during the investigation and detained for most of the day.

Following a jury trial before Mr Justice Caulfield in the Queen’s Bench Division, she was awarded £12,000 for false imprisonment. The Commissioner appealed, arguing that there were reasonable grounds for her arrest, that the judge’s directions on damages were defective, and that the award was excessive. The central issues were the sufficiency of reasonable suspicion, the proper direction on damages, and the threshold for appellate interference with a jury award.

The appeal was dismissed unanimously, with costs.

1. Reasonable suspicion. Waller LJ held that the trial judge had applied the correct test. A constable may arrest without a warrant where an arrestable offence has been committed and there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person arrested is guilty. Prima facie evidence is not required. Information which would lead reasonable people to believe that the suspect may be guilty is sufficient, and a later discovery that the information was mistaken does not itself make the arrest unlawful.
2. Application to Mrs Reynolds. The police had substantial grounds for suspecting Mr Reynolds, but the matters connecting Mrs Reynolds with the suspected offences were that she lived with him, was a company secretary and had visited The Maltings. Those matters did not provide reasonable grounds for suspecting that she was guilty of an arrestable offence. The ruling on liability was therefore correct.
3. Damages. Waller LJ held that the summing-up could not be faulted merely because it did not use the word compensation. O’Connor LJ added that damages should ordinarily be understood as compensating the claimant for loss of liberty and damage to reputation flowing from it, and that it is preferable to distinguish compensation from any additional award of exemplary damages.
4. Exemplary damages and aggravation. Both Waller LJ and O’Connor LJ considered the direction on exemplary damages inaccurate or potentially inaccurate. The point did not affect the result because the jury expressly stated that they had not included exemplary damages. O’Connor LJ further explained that, in ordinary false imprisonment cases, matters sometimes described as aggravating are generally part of the complaint about the loss of liberty and treatment during detention, rather than a separate category requiring special direction.
5. Jury assessment. The award was high, but the applicable question was whether no reasonable jury could properly have reached it, not what figure the appellate judges would themselves have awarded. Given the seriousness of the unlawful detention and the evidence, that threshold was not met.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): in [1982] EWCA Civ 7, the appeal against the jury’s award was dismissed with costs.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: following a jury trial before Mr Justice Caulfield, Mrs Reynolds was awarded £12,000 for false imprisonment.