Huddlestone v Bassetlaw District Council

Compensation for loss caused by a stop notice under section 186 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is confined to actual, ascertainable loss directly attributable to the prohibition. Section 186(5)(a) excludes compensation for any prohibited activity which, while the notice is in force, constitutes or contributes to a breach of planning control. The exclusion applies to the actual circumstances, not hypothetical possibilities that planning conditions might later be discharged. It does not distinguish pre-commencement conditions from other conditions. A stop notice preventing continuation of development already begun in breach remains within the exclusion, although the exclusion would lift if the relevant conditions were discharged during the notice period.

Mr Keith Huddlestone claimed compensation under section 186 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 for losses allegedly caused by a stop notice served by Bassetlaw District Council during planning enforcement proceedings concerning accommodation units at Lound Hall.

The Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), in its decision dated 10 July 2017 and reported at [2017] UKUT 0238 (LC), decided a preliminary issue against him. It held that section 186(5)(a) excluded compensation because development remained in breach of planning conditions throughout the period when the stop notice was in force. The central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the possibility of obtaining outstanding approvals, or carrying out lawful future development, prevented that exclusion from applying.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The stop notice was not challenged as unlawful under section 183 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The issue was the proper interpretation and application of section 186.
2. Section 186(2) provides compensation only for ascertainable loss or damage directly attributable to the prohibition in the stop notice. The statutory scheme follows the reality principle. The relevant circumstances are those which actually existed while the notice was in force, not a hypothetical scenario.
3. Section 186(5)(a) excludes compensation for the prohibition of any activity which, at any time while the notice is in force, constitutes or contributes to a breach of planning control. The provision means what it says. It does not distinguish between breaches involving pre-commencement conditions and breaches involving other planning conditions.
4. The stop notice prohibited the continuation of an activity which had already begun in breach of several conditions. The fact that further units had not yet been sited, or that they might have been lawfully sited if approvals had later been obtained, did not prevent the activity from falling within section 186(5)(a). Throughout the relevant period, the necessary approvals had not been sought or obtained, and any further development would have breached planning control.
5. If the pre-commencement conditions had been discharged while the notice was in force, the exclusion would have lifted for activity which thereafter no longer constituted or contributed to a breach. That did not occur. No additional units were brought onto the land.
6. No words could properly be read into section 186(5)(a) to create an exception for activity which could or might later cease to be a breach. The clear statutory construction did not conflict with the principle that property rights should not be removed without clear legislative language. The court also noted an alternative analysis: any loss would not have been directly attributable to the stop notice itself.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal dismissed. The court upheld the Upper Tribunal’s decision on the preliminary issue.
• Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber): On 10 July 2017, the Tribunal held that section 186(5)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 prevented the compensation claim. The decision is reported at [2017] UKUT 0238 (LC).