Kannan v London Borough of Newham

Suitability under the homelessness provisions of the Housing Act 1996 is a question of degree. Accommodation suitable in the short term may become unsuitable through the passage of time. The authority must consider both the period already spent there and the likely future duration.

Where an applicant is disabled, the public sector equality duty requires a sharp and substantive focus on the disability, its extent and its practical effect on the applicant’s housing needs. Reciting the correct formula is insufficient. General housing shortages remain relevant, but a comparison with other applicants must recognise disabled persons’ different needs and the possibility of more favourable treatment.

The local authority accepted that the appellant was unintentionally homeless and in priority need, and therefore owed him the full housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996. It accommodated his family in a first-floor flat accessible by 14 external steps. The appellant had serious mobility difficulties and complained that the stairs and bathing facilities made the accommodation unsuitable.

A medical adviser identified a need for ground-floor or lift-accessible accommodation and accessible bathing facilities. Nevertheless, the reviewing officer decided that the accommodation remained suitable. Recorder Howlett dismissed an appeal from that decision in the Central London County Court. The central issues were whether the review properly addressed the medical assessment, the duration of occupation and the public sector equality duty.

1. Appeal allowed. The reviewing officer’s decision contained material legal errors and could not stand.

2. Suitability under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 is a matter of degree rather than a binary classification. Applying Birmingham CC v Ali [2009] UKHL 36, accommodation suitable in the short term may cease to be suitable in the medium or longer term. The authority must consider the period already spent in the accommodation and the period for which the applicant is expected to remain. The reviewing officer recorded but failed to address that the appellant had already occupied the flat for more than a year.

3. The medical assessment identified ground-floor or lift-accessible accommodation and accessible bathing facilities as housing needs. The reviewing officer wrongly treated the stairs principally as a matter of inconvenience. The statement that temporary accommodation was not medically unacceptable did not establish that it was suitable, particularly because tenure was not itself a medical matter.

4. The public sector equality duty required a sharp and substantive focus on the appellant’s disability, its extent and its likely effects. The officer accepted the appellant’s account of severe pain but, without explanation, reduced it to discomfort and inconvenience. He also failed to determine the complaint about inaccessible bathing facilities or give reasons for rejecting that material ground.

5. Housing scarcity and competing demand may legitimately inform suitability. However, a general reference to people living in less than ideal conditions did not satisfy the equality duty. The comparison failed to consider whether those persons were disabled or had comparable needs. A later recitation of the correct equality-duty formula could not cure the absence of the required analysis.

6. The court applied a benevolent reading to the decision letter and avoided minute textual criticism. Even on that approach, the accumulated failures rendered the review inadequate. Moylan LJ agreed with Lewison LJ.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the appellant’s appeal and held that the reviewing officer’s suitability decision could not stand: [2019] EWCA Civ 57.

2. Central London County Court: Recorder Howlett dismissed the statutory appeal from the local authority’s review decision on 26 April 2018.