Maughan, R (On the Application Of) v Her Majesty's Senior Coroner for Oxfordshire

At an inquest where suicide is in issue, the standard of proof is the civil standard: whether suicide is more probable than not. That standard applies consistently to both short-form and narrative conclusions. No heightened or intermediate civil standard is permissible. The approach does not change because an Article 2 investigation requires consideration of the circumstances of death. The notes to Form 2 under the Coroners (Inquests) Rules 2013 do not themselves prescribe a criminal standard. The position remains different for unlawful killing: the criminal standard continues to apply under binding authority, although that discussion was obiter.

James Maughan was found hanging in his prison cell. At the inquest, the Senior Coroner instructed the jury to decide, on the balance of probabilities, whether he intended fatally to hang himself. The jury returned a narrative conclusion that he probably intended to die.

The Divisional Court upheld the civil standard for both short-form and narrative conclusions in its decision at [2018] EWHC 1955 (Admin). The deceased’s brother appealed, arguing that the criminal standard applied whenever suicide was in issue. The central questions were whether the standard differed according to the form of conclusion and what standard should apply to suicide at an inquest.

The appeal was dismissed. The civil standard of proof applies throughout an inquest where suicide is in issue. It applies to both a short-form conclusion and a narrative conclusion.

1. An inquest is primarily inquisitorial and investigative. It is neither criminal nor civil litigation and is concerned with establishing facts, rather than determining guilt or liability. The statutory scheme in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, including the requirement in section 5(2) to ascertain the circumstances of death where necessary to avoid a Convention breach, supports an expansive factual investigation.
2. A hybrid approach, applying the criminal standard to a short-form conclusion but the civil standard to a narrative conclusion, was illogical and liable to cause confusion. The ordinary civil standard is proof that the fact in issue is more probable than not. There is no heightened or intermediate standard, including where the issue is serious or concerns conduct that would otherwise be criminal.
3. The fact that suicide ceased to be a crime under section 1 of the Suicide Act 1961, the need for effective Article 2 investigations, and consistency with other findings in a narrative conclusion all supported the civil standard.
4. Rule 34 of the Coroners (Inquests) Rules 2013 required use of Form 2, but the notes appended to that form were not substantive rules. They merely recorded an understanding of the law and could not prescribe a different standard.
5. The criminal-standard rule in ex parte Evans (unrep. 24 May 1984) was overruled. The reasoning concerning suicide in ex parte Gray [1988] 1 QB 466 and the statement concerning suicide in McCurbin [1990] 1 WLR 719 were not to be followed, the latter being obiter.
6. Obiter observations indicated that the criminal standard continued to apply to unlawful killing, because the unlawful-killing decision in McCurbin was binding. The Court recommended that the position be stated expressly in the Coroners rules.

No separate direction concerning a presumption against suicide was required. It was sufficient to direct the jury that suicide could be determined only if it was more likely than not that the deceased deliberately killed himself intending to take his own life.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal and upheld the use of the civil standard for suicide conclusions at inquests.
• Administrative Court (Divisional Court): in [2018] EWHC 1955 (Admin), held that the civil standard applied to both short-form and narrative conclusions.