Sidhu & Ors, R. v

A sentencing judge may find that an offender who has been acquitted of murder intended to cause serious injury, provided that the finding falls short of the intent required for murder and is consistent with the verdict. There is a range between trivial harm and the level of serious harm which constitutes murderous intent.

For perverting the course of justice, sentence should reflect the seriousness of the underlying offence, the persistence of the deception and its actual effect on justice. Deterrence may play a modest part even without evidence of prevalence, but sentence must distinguish offenders whose roles and knowledge differ materially.

At Birmingham Crown Court, Andrew was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter for fatally stabbing Reagan Asbury. He received 14 years’ imprisonment. Sidhu and Kemp-Francis were each convicted of perverting the course of justice after assisting Andrew’s escape and the disposal of the knife, and each received two years and six months’ imprisonment.

Sidhu and Kemp-Francis appealed against sentence. Andrew renewed his application after a single judge refused permission. The appeals raised whether the sentencing judge could find that Andrew intended serious injury despite the murder acquittal, whether the sentences were excessive, and the proper role of deterrence in sentencing for perverting the course of justice.

1. Andrew’s appeal was allowed to a limited extent only. The judge was entitled, on the CCTV evidence, to find that Andrew deliberately ran up behind an unthreatening victim and stabbed him in the neck with an intention to cause serious injury. A sentencing judge must make factual findings to the criminal standard, give any appropriate benefit of doubt, and avoid inconsistency with the jury’s verdict. The finding was consistent with manslaughter because the judge distinguished serious injury from harm sufficiently serious in law to establish murderous intent.
2. There is no necessary legal equivalence between all injury described in ordinary language as serious and the intent required for murder. The latter threshold is higher than an intention to cause non-trivial harm. The judge’s finding therefore did not undermine the acquittal of murder. The 14-year sentence was not manifestly excessive.
3. Under Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 243(2), the court had to specify the 22 days Andrew spent in Spanish custody awaiting extradition. Those days were to count as time served. The appeal was permitted and allowed to that extent.
4. Kemp-Francis’s appeal was dismissed. A sentencing court dealing with perverting the course of justice should consider the gravity of the substantive offence, the persistence of the conduct, and its effect upon the investigation and administration of justice. Such offending commonly merits immediate custody. Deterrence may properly have a modest role independently of prevalence, consistently with the duty in section 142(1B) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to have regard to reducing crime.
5. Sidhu’s appeal was allowed in part. The judge erred in treating Sidhu as no less culpable than Kemp-Francis. Kemp-Francis’s proximity to the stabbing gave him materially greater knowledge of Andrew’s use of the knife. Sidhu’s sentence was set aside and replaced with 22 months’ imprisonment. All other applications were dismissed.
6. The court additionally advised parties to ensure that video material is compatible with court equipment and, where footage is lengthy, to provide a short index identifying salient events. This was practical appellate guidance rather than a ground of decision.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Sidhu’s sentence appeal was allowed to the extent that his sentence was reduced to 22 months. Andrew’s renewed application was permitted and his appeal was allowed only to direct that 22 days’ Spanish extradition custody count as time served. Kemp-Francis’s appeal was dismissed.
• Crown Court at Birmingham: On 1 August 2018, Andrew was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment. Sidhu and Kemp-Francis were convicted of perverting the course of justice and each sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment.