Wilson, R v

When sentencing for unlawful-act manslaughter, the court must honour the jury’s verdict. Where the defendant neither intended to kill nor to cause grievous bodily harm, the death must be treated as unintended and the offence must not be sentenced as murder. A sentencing judge is nevertheless not bound to adopt the version of events most favourable to the defendant. The judge must apply the criminal standard of proof and give the defendant any benefit of doubt, but may make factual findings consistent with the manslaughter verdict.

A finding of dangerousness does not itself require an extended sentence. It remains necessary to assess whether the statutory sentence is appropriate on the facts.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Stafford of the manslaughter of his former partner, having been acquitted of murder. He admitted causing her death by forceful compression of her neck, but contended that he had acted in lawful self-defence during a struggle involving a knife.

He received an extended sentence of 20 years, comprising 15 years’ custody and a five-year extended licence period. His renewed application for permission to appeal conviction alleged deficiencies by his legal representatives, unfairness at trial and shortcomings in the evidence. His sentence appeal challenged the factual basis of sentence, the assessment of dangerousness and the length of the extended sentence.

1. The court refused the renewed application for permission to appeal against conviction and dismissed the appeal against sentence.

2. The complaints about trial representation, disclosure, absent witnesses, medical evidence, the agreed reading of evidence, editing of interview material and judicial bias disclosed no arguable ground of appeal. Considered separately and together, they did not cast doubt on the safety of the manslaughter conviction.

3. Applying the guidance in Attorney General's Reference Nos 60, 62 and 63 of 2009 (R v Appleby and Others) [2009] EWCA Crim 2693, manslaughter based on unlawful violence must not be sentenced as murder. The judge had not done so. He was entitled to sentence on the basis that the appellant had used intentional violence causing harm just short of grievous bodily harm during a violent struggle.

4. R v Bertram [2003] EWCA Crim 2026 established that a sentencing judge need not accept the factual version most favourable to the defence. The judge was required to apply the criminal burden and afford any benefit of doubt, but could reject the characterisation of the killing as merely excessive force in otherwise legitimate self-defence.

5. The factual findings on the background violence, the preceding and fatal assault, the extensive injuries, alcohol-fuelled violence, and the treatment of the body were open to the sentencing judge. A 15-year custodial term was at the upper end of the appropriate range, but was not manifestly excessive.

6. The finding of dangerousness was also open to the judge, who had presided at trial and assessed the evidence. A history of domestic violence, the nature and extent of the fatal violence, and the interference with the victim’s clothing supported a significant risk of serious harm to future partners. Dangerousness did not automatically require an extended sentence, but the extended sentence imposed was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The renewed application for permission to appeal against conviction was refused and the appeal against sentence was dismissed.
• Crown Court at Stafford: The appellant was convicted of manslaughter, acquitted of murder, and sentenced to an extended sentence of 20 years comprising 15 years’ custody and a five-year extended licence period.