Case details
Summary
In sentencing for unlawful act manslaughter, a case does not fall within the lower culpability category where the offender knew that the victim was frail and vulnerable, shoved the victim, and was reckless as to injury. The category-D factor requiring no obvious risk of more than minor harm is not met in those circumstances.
Mental health difficulties which provide only a partial explanation for offending may justify some reduction from the category-C starting point. They do not establish substantially reduced responsibility without supporting evidence. Persistent witness intimidation requires deterrence, but consecutive sentences must reflect totality.
Factual background
Townsend was convicted in the Crown Court at Bristol of the manslaughter of her frail father and of witness intimidation. She later pleaded guilty to breaching a restraining order protecting her sister. On 20 September 2019, the sentencing judge imposed a total of two years and eight months’ imprisonment.
The Attorney General sought leave under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to refer the sentence as unduly lenient. The central questions were whether the manslaughter properly fell within category C rather than category D of the unlawful act manslaughter guideline, and what total sentence properly reflected the additional intimidation and restraining-order offences.
Held
Disposition
The court granted leave to refer the case, held that the sentences were unduly lenient, quashed them, and substituted a total sentence of four years and nine months’ imprisonment.
On the sentencing judge’s own findings, the manslaughter was a category-C case under the Sentencing Council’s Definitive Guideline for unlawful act manslaughter. Townsend knew that her father was frail and vulnerable. She shoved him after already injuring him and was reckless as to whether he would be injured. There was therefore an obvious risk of more than minor harm, so the category-D factor was unavailable.
The psychiatric evidence required proper weight and entitled the judge to make some downward adjustment from the category-C starting point. It did not show that Townsend’s responsibility was substantially reduced. The remaining mitigation was no greater than the substantial aggravating features, including the victim’s vulnerability, the earlier violence, the failure to assist, and the absence of remorse.
A sentence for manslaughter of less than four years and six months could not properly have been imposed. The persistent and threatening witness intimidation called for deterrence. The breach of the restraining order was also serious because it was committed while Townsend was on bail awaiting sentence. Applying totality, those two offences should increase the manslaughter sentence by at least three months.
The substituted sentences were four years and six months for manslaughter and three months for each of witness intimidation and breach of the restraining order. The latter sentences were concurrent with each other but consecutive to the manslaughter sentence.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
- Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On the Attorney General’s reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the court held the total sentence unduly lenient, quashed it, and substituted a total of four years and nine months’ imprisonment.
- Crown Court at Bristol: Townsend was convicted of manslaughter and witness intimidation, pleaded guilty to breach of a restraining order, and was sentenced on 20 September 2019 to a total of two years and eight months’ imprisonment.
Lower court decision
Key cases cited
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Cases citing this case
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