Palmer, R. v

When the Crown Court revokes a community order and imposes imprisonment for the original summary-only offences, it imposes those sentences for the first time. Its powers are therefore limited by section 133(1) of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980, including the six-month aggregate limit for consecutive custodial terms. This differs from activating a suspended sentence, because the custodial sentence was imposed when suspended.

The court must also take account of compliance with the community order. A consecutive sentence may properly reflect a separate episode of criminality where the overall sentence remains consistent with totality.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Magistrates’ Court to offences arising from domestic violence, assaults on his partner’s children, criminal damage and affray. He was committed to the Crown Court at Taunton for sentence. The Crown Court imposed a total of 14 months’ imprisonment for those offences.

The appellant had also been subject to a six-month community order for two drug-driving offences and driving while disqualified. On revoking that order, the Crown Court imposed concurrent sentences of up to four months for those original summary-only offences, consecutive to the 14-month sentence, producing a total of 18 months’ imprisonment.

He appealed against the consecutive two-month sentence for affray and against the sentence imposed after revocation. The central issue was whether the Crown Court was constrained by the six-month limit applicable to consecutive sentences for summary-only offences.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The court upheld the consecutive two-month sentence for affray. It reflected a separate episode after the police had attended, rather than criminality already encompassed by the earlier offences. Given the seriousness of the sustained domestic violence and the concurrent treatment of other offences, that addition did not offend the totality principle.

2. Paragraph 23 of Schedule 8 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 permitted the Crown Court to revoke the community order and deal with the appellant for the original offences. In doing so, it was required to take account of the extent of his compliance with the order.

3. The court distinguished the suspended-sentence authorities, R v Chamberlain (1992) 13 Cr App R(S) 525 and R v Hester [2016] 2 Cr App R(S) 43. Activation of a suspended sentence does not impose imprisonment anew: the sentence was imposed when the suspended sentence order was made. Here, however, the original order was a community order. On revocation and re-sentence under paragraph 23(2)(b)(ii), the Crown Court imposed imprisonment for the summary-only offences for the first time.

4. Accordingly, section 133(1) of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 limited the Crown Court to an aggregate of six months’ imprisonment for the original summary-only offences. Reflecting that constraint and the appellant’s limited compliance with the curfew requirement, the sentence for driving while disqualified was reduced from four months to two months, concurrent with the two drug-driving sentences but consecutive to the 14-month sentence. The total sentence was reduced from 18 months to 16 months’ imprisonment.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal only to the extent of reducing the total sentence to 16 months’ imprisonment.
• Crown Court at Taunton: Sentenced the appellant for the offences committed to it for sentence and later revoked the community order, imposing a total sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment.
• Magistrates’ Court: Imposed a six-month community order on 8 November 2018 for two drug-driving offences and driving while disqualified. The appellant also entered guilty pleas there to the later offences before committal for sentence.