Shaid, R. v

Evidence of a deceased person’s bad character is admissible under Criminal Justice Act 2003 section 100(1)(b) only where it has substantial probative value in relation to a matter of substantial importance in the case. Evidence that merely shows a readiness to make threats, without materially assisting the issue of access to a firearm, may properly be excluded.

The trial judge’s evaluative decision on admissibility will ordinarily attract appellate restraint. Where hearsay allegations are unproven and likely to generate satellite issues, their limited evidential value may justify exclusion. In any event, a conviction remains safe where the excluded material could not realistically affect the verdict when assessed with the evidence admitted and the strength of the prosecution case.

Following a retrial at the Central Criminal Court, Mohammed Shaid was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 30 years. He appealed against conviction with limited leave.

The appellant’s case at trial was that the deceased had produced the gun, that the appellant stabbed him in self-defence, and that the fatal shot was accidental. The central factual issue was who brought the gun to the scene.

The trial judge admitted evidence of the deceased’s drug addiction, aggression, criminality and an earlier conviction connected with a firearm. The judge excluded a later conviction under section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986, related threats, and unproven hearsay allegations of further firearm threats. The appeal challenged those exclusions and, consequentially, the safety of the conviction.

1. Appeal dismissed. The trial judge did not err in excluding the additional bad-character evidence concerning the deceased.

2. Under section 100(1)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the question was whether the evidence had substantial probative value concerning a matter of substantial importance in the case as a whole. The critical issue was access to the gun and who brought it to the scene. The jury already had substantial evidence of the deceased’s aggression, drug addiction, threats, dishonesty and a prior conviction involving possession and concealment of a gun.

3. The later public-order conviction and its accompanying threat to shoot people would add little. It showed a readiness to threaten, but did not materially demonstrate access to firearms. The deceased’s false account of his earlier firearm conviction was also liable to confuse rather than assist the jury.

4. The unproven accounts reported by the deceased’s mother were still weaker. They concerned threats rather than actual access to weapons, had limited probative value, and were likely to create side issues and satellite litigation. The court noted that section 126(1)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 permits exclusion of hearsay where the case for exclusion, including undue waste of time, substantially outweighs the case for admission.

5. Admission of bad-character evidence is an evaluative judgment for the trial judge, to which the appellate court will be slow to interfere. Even if some additional material ought to have been admitted, the conviction was safe. The appellant’s changing accounts, his return to confront the deceased while hooded, and his prompt departure from the country made the prosecution case overwhelming. The excluded evidence could not cast doubt on the verdict.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appeal against conviction was dismissed.
• Central Criminal Court: Following a retrial, the appellant was convicted of murder on 13 July 2018 and sentenced on 23 July 2018 to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 30 years.