Rashid, R. v

A life sentence for terrorism offences remains a sentence of last resort. It is nevertheless justified where a dangerous offender’s extremely serious and sustained conduct, considered as a whole, makes life imprisonment necessary despite a realistic prospect of de-radicalisation.

When applying the sentencing guideline, online dissemination of terrorist material and encouragement of others may amount to significant assistance or encouragement without amounting to co-ordination. The likely consequences of the conduct must be assessed separately. Correcting guideline categorisation may require reduction of the minimum term without displacing life sentences justified by the overall seriousness of the offending.

The applicant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Woolwich to three offences under section 5 and one offence under section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006. Over more than a year, he used online channels to distribute terrorist material, encourage lone-actor attacks, assist an Islamic State fighter, and prepare to travel abroad to engage in jihad.

The sentencing judge found him dangerous under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. He imposed life sentences on counts 1 to 3, each with a 25-year minimum term, and a concurrent determinate sentence on count 4. The applicant renewed his application for leave to appeal against sentence after refusal by the single judge.

The central issues were dangerousness, the proper guideline categories for the section 5 offences, and whether life sentences and their minimum terms were excessive.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The court upheld the life sentences on counts 1 to 3 but reduced their minimum terms from 25 to 19 years, less time spent on remand. The sentence on count 4 remained four years and six months’ imprisonment.

2. The judge was entitled to find the applicant dangerous for the purposes of section 229 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The sustained and extensive nature of his offending, the pre-sentence assessment of high risk, and the evidence of his isolated and rigid outlook provided a clear foundation for that conclusion. The reports’ indication that he might benefit from de-radicalisation did not undermine the finding. They did not establish how long that process would take, and his continued refusal to provide passwords and late guilty pleas supported the conclusion that it might be slow.

3. The sentencing judge had erred in aspects of the guideline categorisation. Count 1 involved category B culpability but harm category 2, because multiple deaths were risked but not very likely. Counts 2 and 3 involved category C culpability: providing links and online material was significant assistance or encouragement, but did not amount to co-ordinating others. Count 2 was therefore category 1C. Count 3 was also category 1C because the scale and frequency of the postings made multiple deaths very likely.

4. The corrected categories gave a life-sentence starting point, a 15-year minimum-term starting point, and a 10-to-20-year range. The aggravating features outweighed the absence of previous convictions. Considering the three offences together, their seriousness justified life imprisonment under section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, notwithstanding that life imprisonment is a last resort.

5. A minimum term of 20 years would have been appropriate after trial. Since the guilty pleas were entered only after the prosecution opening, the maximum proper reduction was five per cent. The court substituted a 19-year minimum term on each life sentence, resulting in a minimum term of 18 years and 146 days after credit for 219 days on remand.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): leave granted and appeal allowed in part. The life sentences were upheld, but the minimum terms were reduced.

• Crown Court at Woolwich: on 13 July 2018, following guilty pleas, the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment on counts 1 to 3 with 25-year minimum terms, and to four years and six months’ imprisonment on count 4.

• Single judge: refused leave to appeal against sentence. The applicant renewed the application before the full court.