Douglas & Anor, R v

On an appeal against sentence, the court assesses whether the total sentence is just and proportionate, reflects the offender’s culpability and harm, and is manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. Concurrent sentences may properly be structured by increasing the lead sentence to reflect additional offending.

Serious and deliberate breaches of trust against a frail and vulnerable person, including concealment and attempts to obtain further funds, can justify immediate custodial sentences despite substantial personal mitigation, remorse, low risk of reoffending, and caring responsibilities. Significant additional harm under the applicable sentencing guideline may justify moving an offence into a higher category.

Carly Douglas and her mother, Susan Stewart, were sentenced at the Crown Court at Newcastle-upon-Tyne for stealing from a 94-year-old care-home resident. Stewart was the care home’s general manager and Douglas worked there as a bank carer.

Stewart made cash withdrawals from the resident’s account and set up internet banking. Douglas transferred £18,000 from the account into her own account, transferred £6,000 to Stewart, and unsuccessfully impersonated the resident in calls to the bank. Stewart later made false care-record entries to conceal the withdrawals.

Douglas appealed a total sentence of two years and six months’ imprisonment. Stewart applied for leave to appeal against a total sentence of two years and three months’ imprisonment. The central issue was whether either total sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

1. Douglas’s appeal was dismissed and Stewart’s application for leave to appeal was refused. The court held that neither total sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

2. The correct appellate question was whether the total sentence was just and proportionate when viewed against the whole criminality, culpability, harm, and personal mitigation. It was not necessary to reassess each concurrent sentence separately. The sentencing judge had properly used an uplift to the lead theft sentence to reflect the additional criminality of money laundering and fraud.

3. Douglas’s offending was a gross and deliberate breach of trust against a frail and vulnerable victim. Her continued attempts, while impersonating the victim, to obtain further money after the account was frozen materially aggravated the offending. Her psychiatric vulnerability, difficult background, caring responsibilities, remorse, financial pressure, and guilty plea had been fully considered. They did not make the immediate custodial sentence disproportionate.

4. In Stewart’s case, the judge was entitled to treat theft of approximately £3,000 as falling into the higher guideline category because of significant additional harm to both the victim and the care home. Stewart’s managerial position, repeated withdrawals, false entries made to conceal them, and her facilitation of Douglas’s larger theft justified the sentence imposed. Her health difficulties, good character, caring role, remorse, and late guilty plea did not render a 27-month total sentence excessive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Douglas’s appeal against sentence was dismissed. Stewart’s renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.
• Crown Court at Newcastle-upon-Tyne: On 18 January 2019, Douglas received a total sentence of two years and six months’ imprisonment. Stewart received a total sentence of two years and three months’ imprisonment.