Kuznetsov, R (On the Application Of) v The London Borough of Camden

A housing allocation scheme may exclude applicants with a high level of household savings or assets. Examples given in the scheme do not necessarily exhaust the general exclusion where the wording indicates otherwise. A former leaseholder who has acquired a property under the right to buy is not, in the ordinary context of such a scheme, a “council tenant”. A discretionary power to make a direct offer of accommodation does not create an entitlement to such an offer or necessarily require consideration where the relevant criteria plainly cannot apply. The authority may reasonably assess available compensation and company shares as assets where the applicant has failed to provide credible evidence to the contrary.

The claimant sought judicial review of decisions by the London Borough of Camden refusing him entry to its housing register under Part 6 of the Housing Act 1996. Permission was granted on one issue only: whether the council had properly applied paragraph 2.2.5 of its housing allocation scheme.

The claimant had previously owned a leasehold property affected by compulsory purchase and redevelopment. He argued that the scheme’s examples of excluded applicants were exhaustive, that the evidence of his assets was inadequate, and that exemptions relating to regeneration, redevelopment and direct offers applied. The central issues were the proper construction of paragraph 2.2.5, the meaning of “council tenant”, and whether the council had acted lawfully and reasonably.

The claim was dismissed.

1. Paragraph 2.2.5 of the allocation scheme excluded applicants with a “high level of household savings or assets”. The word “including” showed that the two following bullet points were examples of the general exclusion, rather than exhaustive limits on it.

2. The council was entitled to conclude that the claimant had substantial assets. Compensation had been offered for his former property and remained available to him, while evidence indicated that he held company shares of substantial value. The claimant had failed to provide satisfactory evidence contradicting those matters. In view of the inconsistent information in his applications and his failure to co-operate with requests for documentation, the council was entitled to treat his assertions with scepticism.

3. In any event, both examples in paragraph 2.2.5 applied. The claimant had recently owned the property. The reference to evidence of sale did not restrict the provision to cases where ownership ended by sale rather than compulsory purchase. The compensation represented capital arising from his recent ownership.

4. The claimant was not a “council tenant” for the purposes of paragraph 4.5.6. Although he was legally a tenant, he had exercised the right to buy and held a lease. The scheme distinguished council tenants from leaseholders and treated their respective interests differently.

5. Paragraph 7.1.3 did not assist the claimant. He had already left the property, so he did not need to move urgently to facilitate redevelopment. There was no evidential basis for concluding that moving him was in the council’s wider strategic interests. In any event, the provision was discretionary and conferred no entitlement to a direct offer.

6. After circulation of the draft judgment, the court considered new submissions concerning sections 11 and 21 of the Interpretation Act 1978 and section 219 of the Housing Act 1996. Applying the approach in Gosvenor London Ltd v Aygun AluminiumUK Ltd [2018] EWHC 227 (TCC), the judge exercised the discretion to consider the new points but concluded that they did not alter the result. The statutory provisions did not displace the contextual meaning of “council tenant” in the scheme.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The application was dismissed by the High Court (Administrative Court).