Bedzhamov & Ors Re Vneshprombank LLC

An application made before expiry of a deadline for a reasonable extension of time is ordinarily granted where it will not imperil hearing dates or otherwise disrupt proceedings. The court must nevertheless assess the request in its procedural context. Relevant considerations include the length and history of any previous extensions, the promptness of the further application, the applicant’s opportunity to prepare, the explanation for delay, and prejudice caused by continuing uncertainty. A substantial workload or potential legal merits will not necessarily justify a further extension where the applicant has already had adequate time and has sought a further extension late. The court may refuse the extension while leaving other procedural or substantive routes available.

Vneshprombank LLC sought an extension of time for the first defendant to apply to set aside or vary freezing and search orders made on 27 March 2019. The deadline had originally been fixed at 10 May, proposed by the first defendant’s counsel, and had then been extended by Morgan J to 17 May. The first defendant sought a further extension to 31 May, relying on the scale of the supporting evidence, work required on disclosure and search orders, funding difficulties, and possible arguments concerning Russian law and non-disclosure. The claimant opposed the further extension. The issue was whether, in the circumstances, the requested extension was reasonable.

1. Application refused. The application was not one for relief from sanctions. The principles governing relief from sanctions therefore did not apply.
2. The ordinary principle, stated in Hallam Estates v Baker (2014) 4 Cost LR, is that the court will grant a reasonable extension sought before expiry of a deadline where it does not imperil hearing dates or otherwise disrupt the proceedings.
3. The court assessed the application in its full procedural context. The first defendant and his advisers had known the scale of the evidence for nearly two months. The original deadline had been proposed after approximately two weeks had been available for considering that evidence, and Morgan J had already granted a short extension after declining the longer period sought.
4. The further application was not made promptly when the anticipated share sale failed to complete. The solicitors remained on the record and were substantially engaged by 8 May, while continuing to work on other matters. The application was therefore an unreasonable second attempt to obtain the longer extension.
5. There would also be prejudice to the claimant through continuing uncertainty concerning the freezing and search orders. The potential importance or substantial nature of a future set-aside application did not outweigh the delay and lack of detail in the explanation.
6. Refusal did not prevent the first defendant from seeking relief from sanctions, raising relevant matters in the defence, or applying for alternative relief. The extension application was accordingly refused.