Ades v London Borough of Camden

Housing allocation schemes must be interpreted practically and with sensible flexibility, recognising the wide discretion given to local housing authorities. A claimant is not entitled to allocation points merely because they have medical conditions or would prefer alternative accommodation. The scheme’s stated eligibility criteria must be satisfied, including any required causal connection between housing conditions and the claimant’s health. A reviewing court will not substitute its own assessment where the authority has considered the relevant evidence, applied the scheme, and reached a rational and adequately reasoned conclusion.

The claimant sought judicial review of decisions by the defendant local housing authority awarding her no health and housing points and no points for insanitary or unsuitable housing conditions. She relied on extensive physical and mental health evidence, alleged that her privately rented accommodation caused or worsened her conditions, and alleged bias and discrimination.

Following the grant of permission, the authority reconsidered the matter and issued a detailed decision dated 11 April 2019. The court treated that decision as the operative decision under challenge. The central issues were whether the authority had properly considered the evidence, given adequate reasons, applied its allocation scheme lawfully, and acted irrationally or discriminatorily.

1. Judicial review dismissed. The challenges to the decisions dated 30 April 2018, 12 September 2018 and 11 April 2019 failed. There was no order for costs.
2. Under Housing Act 1996, section 166A, the authority was required to operate an allocation scheme setting priorities and procedures for allocating housing. The scheme conferred judgment on decision-makers and did not create an automatic entitlement to points.
3. Following R (o.a.o. Ariemuguvbe) v Islington LBC [2009] EWCA Civ 1308, allocation schemes should be interpreted with a common-sense and practical approach, allowing sensible flexibility for the varied circumstances of applicants. The authority’s officers were entitled to assess the claimant’s circumstances against the scheme and the competing demands for social housing.
4. The claimant did not qualify for disrepair points. The evidence, including the environmental health assessment, did not establish a serious hazard, uninhabitable accommodation, or living conditions which could not be improved. Any issue concerning Camden’s responsibilities as freehold owner was separate from the allocation decision.
5. The health-related points criteria required the medical condition to be caused or worsened by the housing, the property to be incapable of reasonable improvement or adaptation, and rehousing to be likely significantly to improve the condition. The authority accepted the claimant’s medical conditions but rationally found no sufficient causal nexus with the accommodation.
6. The authority had considered the relevant medical and other evidence and gave adequate reasons. Disagreement with the conclusion did not establish irrationality. There was no legitimate expectation of rehousing, no evidential basis for bias or discrimination, and no basis for treating the claimant as an exceptional case.

The judgment records that permission was initially refused by Murray J as premature, but was later granted by Philip Mott QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. The authority subsequently reconsidered the matter. This was a first-instance judicial review decision.