London Borough of Wandsworth v Lennard

In committal proceedings, an injunction carrying penal consequences must be construed with particular precision. Where an order prohibits the use of offensive, foul or threatening words or behaviour “towards” a protected person, verbal abuse requires that person to be present and the words to be directed at them. Words spoken about an absent protected person do not breach that form of injunction, even if they are later communicated to that person. The protective purpose of an injunction must be balanced against the serious consequences of committing a person for contempt. Any genuine uncertainty in a penal provision should be resolved in favour of the person subject to it.

The London Borough of Wandsworth applied to commit Neil Lennard for contempt of an injunction made by Parker J. The order prohibited him from using offensive, foul or threatening words or behaviour towards named local-authority employees, and from sending such communications to them.

The authority alleged one breach: that on 13 February 2019 Mr Lennard had used offensive, foul or threatening words towards Grace Okoro-Anyaeche. Ms Okoro-Anyaeche was not present when the words were spoken. The court was asked to determine, as a preliminary issue, whether the alleged conduct fell within the meaning of “towards” in the injunction.

1. Committal requirements. The court reiterated the strict procedural requirements applicable where contempt is founded on breach of an earlier order, including a penal notice, proper service, clear and separately identified allegations, an opportunity for legal representation, a public hearing, proof beyond reasonable doubt, the right to silence, and separate consideration of committal and sentence. These requirements were considered by reference to Re L (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 173.
2. Meaning of “towards”. The order prohibited the use of offensive, foul or threatening words or behaviour towards the named employee. In the context of alleged verbal abuse, the natural and proper meaning was that the conduct must occur in the presence of, and be directed at, the protected person. Words spoken about an absent person did not satisfy that requirement.
3. Penal consequences. Although the protective purpose of an injunction might support a broad, purposive construction, the possibility of imprisonment required a narrow and certain construction. The court was reinforced in this approach by Atkin v Director of Public Prosecutions (1989) 89 Cr App R 199, particularly the principle that doubt concerning the plain meaning of a penal provision should be resolved in favour of the person subject to it.
4. The possibility that words spoken in the absence of the protected person might later be passed on did not alter the construction. Written or online communications sent to the person, including material later read by them, could fall within the order, but direct verbal abuse in their absence could not.
5. As Ms Okoro-Anyaeche was absent during the only incident pleaded, the alleged breach was not proved. The committal application was dismissed. The court directed that submissions be heard on whether the injunction should be extended in scope, duration, or both.