Gray v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis

On an appeal from a costs-budgeting decision, the appellate court should interfere only where the budgeting judge made an error of law or reached a figure that was manifestly too low. Proportionality requires a reasonable relationship between costs and the matters identified in Civil Procedure Rules 1998, including the sums in issue, complexity, work generated by the paying party and wider public importance. A low-value claim may properly attract a relatively modest budget, even where it is important to the parties and requires a jury trial. The court reviewing a budget assesses whether the figures fall within a reasonable and proportionate range; it need not approve hourly rates or conduct a detailed assessment in advance.

The claimant appealed a costs-budgeting decision made by HHJ Baucher at the Central London County Court on 4 January 2019. The underlying claim arose from the claimant’s arrest, prosecution and acquittal, and alleged unlawful conduct and fabrication by police officers. The claim involved a substantial factual dispute and was listed for a five-day jury trial.

The claimant challenged the budgets allowed for witness statements, trial preparation and trial costs. He argued that the judge had placed excessive weight on the modest value of the claim, failed to account for its complexity and importance, and made several free-standing errors. The central issue was whether the budgeting decision disclosed an error of law or figures so low that the claim could not reasonably be pursued.

1. Appeal refused. The transcript did not disclose an error of law in the budgeting judge’s approach, and the figures allowed were not manifestly too low.
2. Costs-management decisions are case-management decisions. The appellate court should not lightly interfere, but the usual latitude does not protect an erroneous approach to law. The budgeting judge had to assess the reasonable and proportionate relationship between the costs and the factors in CPR 44.3(5), including the sums in issue, complexity, work generated by the paying party and wider factors such as public importance. CPR 3EPD paragraph 7.3 required consideration of whether the budget fell within a reasonable and proportionate range, rather than a detailed assessment in advance.
3. The judge was entitled to take account of the claim’s relatively low value. She was also entitled to regard the factual issues as relatively straightforward, since the case principally concerned competing accounts of an incident and raised no novel or particularly difficult legal issues.
4. The budget phases were not to be assessed in isolation. Earlier incurred work, including work on disclosure and the preparation of the case, was relevant when assessing later witness-statement and trial-preparation costs, to avoid duplication.
5. The judge had taken account, albeit in concise reasons, of the jury trial, the claimant’s vulnerability, the case’s importance and the relevant proportionality factors. A possible misunderstanding about the trial length would not have depressed the figures allowed. The fact that the defendant had offered a higher figure did not make that offer a minimum benchmark.
6. The budgeting court was not required to approve or disapprove particular hourly rates or prescribe how the phase budgets should be divided between counsel and solicitors. Under CPR 3EPD paragraph 7.10, allocation of the approved sums was for the legal team. The appeal was therefore refused.

• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): On 24 May 2019, the appeal from HHJ Baucher’s costs-budgeting decision was refused.
• Central London County Court: On 4 January 2019, HHJ Baucher allowed specified sums for future costs, producing an overall budget of approximately £68,600 to the conclusion of a five-day trial.