A Local Authority v C

In care proceedings following the murder of one parent by the other, a subsisting criminal conviction is admissible under the Civil Evidence Act 1968 and is accepted unless the contrary is proved. The court may treat the fundamental elements necessary for the conviction as established, even though the parties to the criminal and family proceedings differ. Sentencing remarks and prosecution evidence that were not necessary to the verdict do not create issue estoppel and must be evaluated separately.

Placement must be determined by the children’s welfare and the context in which they will grow up. Relevant considerations include the ability of each proposed carer and family environment to provide a consistent account of the events, preserve meaningful relationships with both sides of the family, and support the children’s understanding of both parents. Contact with a convicted parent may properly be withheld where the parent lacks responsibility and insight into the harm caused.

The Local Authority sought care orders under the Children Act 1989 for two children whose mother had been murdered by their father. The children had been living with foster carers under interim care orders. The proposed long-term placements were with their maternal grandmother, supported by a care plan, or their paternal aunt, who sought a special guardianship order.

The court had to determine whether a care order or special guardianship order should be made, where the children should live, what contact the father should have, and which findings were established by the father’s criminal conviction or by the evidence in the family proceedings.

1. Orders. The court made the care orders sought by the Local Authority. The children were to live with their maternal grandmother. The father was to have no contact, with any future contact left to the Local Authority’s discretion.
2. Criminal conviction. Under section 11 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968, the subsisting murder conviction was admissible and the father had not proved the contrary. The conviction followed a contested trial with strong forensic evidence, and his position in the family proceedings substantially repeated the defence rejected by the jury.
3. Issue estoppel and the conviction. Although strict issue estoppel is not generally binding in Children Act proceedings, once the conviction was accepted the court was bound by the fundamental elements of the offence. Murder necessarily involved an intention to kill or cause very serious harm. The difference between the parties in the criminal and family proceedings did not prevent that conclusion in this context. The court therefore rejected the father’s denial of an intention to harm.
4. Limits of the estoppel. The criminal judge’s sentencing remarks were given very great weight but were not findings of fact by the jury and did not create issue estoppel. The father’s alleged controlling and jealous behaviour before the killing was neither established by issue estoppel nor necessarily accepted by the jury. Those matters were assessed on the evidence before the family court.
5. Placement and welfare. The decision was not a comparison of which proposed carer was the better parent. It concerned the context in which the children would grow up. Placement with the maternal grandmother offered the stronger prospect of preserving positive memories of their mother while enabling the children to understand their father’s role and maintain relationships with the paternal family. Placement within the paternal family risked exposing the children to conflicting or minimising accounts of the murder and placing pressure on them to view their father positively. The children’s expressed wishes received somewhat greater weight because of the exceptional circumstances and the nature of the choice.
6. Contact. The father’s continuing denial, lack of responsibility and lack of insight made direct contact, and anything beyond minimal indirect contact, inappropriate at that stage. The order was made having regard to section 34 of the Children Act 1989 and the statutory presumptions concerning contact and involvement.