Meadowsv Examining Court, Malaga, Spain

In an extradition case involving alleged unfitness to plead, oppression under section 25 of the Extradition Act depends on the particular circumstances and the likely operation of the requesting state’s trial process. Extradition will generally be oppressive where the person is unfit to stand trial and is inevitably likely to remain so, without an adequate prospect of return or other protection. Otherwise, fitness is ordinarily for the requesting court.

The Pritchard criteria must be assessed in the context of the particular proceedings, including the charges, evidence, proposed defence, procedure and available adjustments. A court should not decide fitness in the abstract. Assurances that the requesting court will assess fitness, provide necessary assistance and avoid an unfair trial may defeat an argument based on oppression or a real risk of a flagrantly unfair trial.

The appellant, who was born deaf and had significant communication and intellectual difficulties, appealed against an order made by District Judge Goldspring at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 5 November 2018 ordering his extradition to Spain to face trial for alleged bank robberies.

The appeal challenged the particularity of the European arrest warrant, the conclusion that extradition would not be oppressive under section 25 of the Extradition Act, the assessment of fitness to plead, and the finding that extradition would not create a real risk of a flagrantly unfair trial under Article 6 ECHR. Article 8 arguments concerning the appellant and his children were also raised.

1. Appeal dismissed. The particulars in the European arrest warrant adequately identified the alleged conspiracy, the appellant’s participation as a member of the joint enterprise and the substantive offences. Section 2(4)(c) did not require detailed allocation of individual roles such as driver, lookout or planner.
2. Under section 25 of the Extradition Act, the court must consider the person’s present condition and the likely consequences of extradition. Following Republic of South Africa v Dewani (No. 2) [2014] EWHC 153 (Admin), there are no hard and fast rules. Extradition would probably be oppressive if the person were unfit to stand trial and would inevitably be found unfit by the requesting court, particularly if he would otherwise face indefinite detention.
3. The fitness assessment must be proceeding-specific. The Pritchard criteria must be applied having regard to the nature and complexity of the case, the evidence, the likely duration, the number of parties, the proposed defence and the adjustments available. As explained in R v Marcantonio [2016] EWCA Crim 14, and R v Walls (Robert) [2011] EWCA Crim 443, the court must rigorously assess the evidence and consider measures enabling effective participation.
4. The evidence did not establish that the appellant was inevitably unfit to plead. The Spanish courts had a fitness procedure, had been informed of his particular needs, had given assurances concerning interpreters and assistance, and had indicated that he would be returned if found unfit. The assessment depended substantially on the trial evidence, proposed defence and practical adjustments, matters best determined by the Spanish trial court.
5. There was no real risk of a flagrantly unfair trial. The Spanish court had to provide a fair trial or no trial at all. Extradition was also proportionate under Article 8 and did not breach Article 3.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Appeal from the decision of District Judge Goldspring at Westminster Magistrates’ Court dated 5 November 2018. The extradition order was upheld and the appeal dismissed.