LA v XYZ (Restriction on Father's Role in Proceedings)

Restricting a parent’s disclosure, participation or party status in family proceedings is an exceptional, fact-specific step. The court must identify, evaluate and balance the competing Article 6 and Article 8 rights of the parent and child. Any restriction must be supported by evidence and go no further than strictly necessary.

Where a parent’s involvement causes grave emotional or psychological harm to the child, the child’s rights may prevail and the parent may be discharged as a party. A local authority may also obtain permission to invoke the inherent jurisdiction where the statutory route cannot achieve the proposed protection and the child is likely to suffer significant harm. Any declaration should preserve necessary safeguards, including information about a life-threatening medical emergency.

The local authority sought a care order concerning Z, permission under section 34(4) of the Children Act 1989 to refuse contact with her father, a declaration under the inherent jurisdiction limiting duties to consult or inform him, and an order discharging him as a party to the care and section 34(4) applications.

Z’s father had been convicted of murdering her mother and was serving a life sentence. Evidence indicated that his continued involvement, including attempts to communicate through third parties, caused Z severe anxiety and emotional distress. The preliminary issue was whether his participation, disclosure rights and involvement in local-authority decision-making should be restricted.

1. Applications granted. The father was discharged as a party to the care and section 34(4) proceedings. Permission was granted to the local authority to apply under the inherent jurisdiction, and the requested declaration was granted subject to a limited exception.
2. Applications restricting disclosure or party status must be considered at the earliest opportunity. They require a separate application, clearly defined orders and evidence specifically establishing why the restriction is necessary. The court must balance the father’s Article 6 and Article 8 rights against Z’s Article 6 and Article 8 rights.
3. The step is exceptional and highly fact-specific. It is justified only where the evidence demonstrates that the parent’s involvement would cause sufficiently grave harm and the restriction is proportionate and strictly necessary. The relevant circumstances included the father’s conviction for murdering Z’s mother, his disregard of the structure governing indirect contact, and the evidence that his involvement triggered serious anxiety and psychological deterioration in Z.
4. Under section 100(3) and (4) of the Children Act 1989, permission for a local authority to invoke the inherent jurisdiction may be granted where the proposed result cannot be achieved through the statutory orders specified in section 100(5), and there is reasonable cause to believe that the child would suffer significant harm without the inherent-jurisdiction intervention.
5. A care order gives the local authority power under section 33(3) and (4) of the Children Act 1989 to manage the exercise of parental responsibility where necessary to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare. That power did not itself provide the complete relief sought, so the inherent jurisdiction was available.
6. The declaration relieved the local authority from duties to consult, refer to or inform the father about Z’s progress, development or wellbeing while she remained in care, except that he was to be informed of any life-threatening medical emergency.

First-instance decision. The judgment does not state any appeal or earlier appellate decision.