Venables & Anor vNews Group Newspapers Ltd & Ors

When sentencing for contempt arising from breach of an injunction, the court must assess the harm caused or risked and the contemnor’s culpability. The penalty must be commensurate with the seriousness of the offending and no more. The court may consider sentencing guidelines by analogy, but must account for the lower maximum penalty and narrower range of sanctions available for contempt. Deliberate, persistent publication intended to defeat an injunction protecting individuals from serious harm will ordinarily cross the custody threshold. Personal mitigation may justify suspension, but the court must uphold the authority of court orders and deter vigilantism. Knowledge of the existence and nature of an injunction is sufficient for liability; personal service is not essential.

The judgment concerned applications by the Attorney General to commit Richard McKeag and Natalie Barker for contempt arising from online publications which breached injunctions protecting the identities, whereabouts and personal information of Jon Venables and Robert Thompson. Both respondents admitted the contempts, so the court determined penalty only.

McKeag published an article containing photographs and identifying information and encouraged wide dissemination. Barker published and re-published images and solicited information about aliases. The central issues were the seriousness of the breaches, the appropriate custodial starting points, the effect of admissions and personal mitigation, and whether committal orders should be suspended.

1. Liability and injunctions. The respondents’ admissions established contempt. The injunctions operated against the world and compliance was mandatory. A person need not have been personally served if aware of the existence and nature of the order. The court’s earlier approach in Attorney General v Harkins and Attorney General v Baines was reaffirmed.
2. Sentencing principles. Breach of an injunction is effectively criminal behaviour, although the court’s powers differ from those in criminal proceedings. Under section 14 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, the maximum penalty is two years’ imprisonment. The sentence must punish, protect the beneficiaries of the injunction, uphold the rule of law, deter vigilantism and encourage compliance. It must reflect harm caused or risked and culpability, and must be no more than commensurate with the seriousness of the offending.
3. The court followed the approach in Amicus Horizon Ltd v Thorley and Doey v Islington Borough Council by having regard to breach-offence sentencing guidelines. The guidelines did not apply directly because contempt carried a lower maximum sentence and offered fewer sentencing options.
4. McKeag’s conduct was deliberate, planned and persistent, and intended to defeat the injunction. It fell within the custody threshold. The appropriate sentence was 16 months, reduced to 12 months for his admissions, suspended for two years because of his serious mental and physical health problems and other mitigation.
5. Barker’s conduct was persistent and defiant, but less serious. It also crossed the custody threshold. The appropriate sentence was 12 months, reduced to eight months for her admissions, suspended for two years because of her personal mitigation, particularly the impact of immediate custody on her children.
6. Each committal order attached formally to the first breach particularised, with no order on the remaining breaches. Further offending would expose each respondent to the suspended custody and any further penalty.