Maughan v Wilmot

The court may impose a general civil restraint order where a litigant persists in making applications that are totally without merit and an extended order is insufficient or inappropriate. Permission applications made while a civil restraint order is in force must be dealt with under the applicable procedural scheme, ordinarily without a hearing. The High Court may determine an application issued in the wrong Division because the High Court is a single court administratively divided into Divisions. A one-day hearing generally attracts summary assessment of costs, with the parties’ conduct taken into account. The court may grant harassment injunctions and make protective financial orders where persistent vexatious litigation causes continuing risk and expense.

This was a first-instance application arising from exceptionally prolonged financial remedy litigation following the parties’ divorce. The applicant sought costs, authority for the receiver to deal with pension funds, a freezing order, a general civil restraint order, and an injunction under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The respondent sought an adjournment so that a previous permission application could be heard orally and later sought amplification and permission to appeal. The central issues were whether the applications should proceed, whether the requested protective and costs orders were justified, and whether the harassment application could be determined in the Family Division.

1. Procedural applications. The respondent’s request for an adjournment was refused. Under FPR PD4B, a substantive application made while a civil restraint order is in force requires prior permission and the permission application must be determined without a hearing. A challenge lies by appeal, subject to any valid direction restricting that right. The respondent was out of time in relation to the earlier refusal.
2. Costs. Under section 51(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the court had wide power to determine by whom and to what extent costs should be paid. The respondent’s conduct was at the top end of misconduct for the purposes of CPR 44.2(4)(a). CPR PD44 para 9.2 made summary assessment the general rule after this one-day hearing, and the applicant’s and receiver’s reasonable costs were awarded, including specified future implementation costs.
3. Protective orders. A freezing order was granted for £100,000 to provide reasonable headroom for further costs. A general civil restraint order was justified under FPR PD4B para 4.1 because the respondent persisted in making applications that were totally without merit and the extended order had not worked. The judge directed that the judgment be supplied to the Attorney General for consideration of an indefinite civil proceedings order under section 42(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.
4. Harassment injunction. The application under section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 could be determined in the Family Division notwithstanding CPR 65.28(b)(i). The High Court is one court, administratively divided into Divisions, and section 49(2) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 favoured complete and final determination without multiplying proceedings. The injunction was granted.
5. The application for amplification was rejected. FPR PD30A para 4.6 concerns material omissions or obvious errors, not requests for further particulars or attempts to advance new or reargued points. Permission to appeal was refused because the proposed appeal had no reasonable prospects of success and there was no other good reason for it to be heard.

This was a first-instance decision. The judgment records earlier orders and appeals in the long-running financial remedy proceedings, but no appeal from the present decision had been determined.