Aydogdu, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In assessing an application under the Turkish business provisions preserved by article 41 of the Additional Protocol, the Secretary of State must consider all relevant circumstances, but need not determine every specific business criterion where other matters provide conclusive reasons for refusal. The order in which the decision letter addresses general and category-specific provisions is not decisive. The letter must be read as a whole and contextually, rather than chronologically. Breach of immigration conditions, including unpaid work where work is prohibited, and deception in obtaining entry may legitimately bear on the exercise of discretion and credibility. A decision remains lawful if it is properly directed, takes account of relevant matters, excludes irrelevant matters, and falls within the range of rational decisions.

The claimant, a Turkish national, entered the United Kingdom as a visitor subject to a prohibition on paid and unpaid work. After being found working at a barber’s shop, he applied for leave to remain under the European Community Association Agreement, relying on the business provisions in HC 510. The Secretary of State refused the application under paragraphs 4 and 21 of HC 510, relying on breach of conditions, deception in the entry-clearance application, adverse credibility, and inadequate evidence of personal funding. Administrative review upheld the refusal. The claimant sought judicial review, arguing that the decision-maker had treated paragraph 4 separately and conclusively, without properly considering the proposed business.

1. Judicial review standards. A decision letter must contain correct legal directions, show that relevant matters were considered and irrelevant matters excluded, and be rational. It must be read in its entirety, with regard to its general and textual context, using common sense.
2. The decision letter’s separate treatment of paragraphs 4 and 21 of HC 510 was not unlawful. Structure was a matter of form rather than substance. The proper question was whether the decision-maker had considered all relevant factors, not the sequence in which the reasoning appeared.
3. The letter had to be read synchronically rather than diachronically. The fact that paragraph 4 appeared before paragraph 21 did not establish that the later business-related matters were excluded from the earlier discretionary assessment.
4. The Secretary of State was entitled to rely on the claimant’s work in breach of his visitor conditions, even though it was unpaid, and on his false answer concerning family in the United Kingdom. Those matters, together with the credibility concerns arising from the circumstances of the application, rationally supported refusal under paragraph 4.
5. Satisfaction of the formal paragraph 21 criteria was not necessarily required before deciding paragraph 4. Where there were otherwise conclusive objections to entry or remaining, it would be unnecessary and potentially absurd to determine a disputed funding criterion, even assuming in the claimant’s favour that it was satisfied.
6. The paragraph 21 funding decision was also lawful. The evidence of a gift was uncorroborated, and there was no evidence that the alleged donor was financially able to make the gift without needing to recall it. Any error concerning the reconciliation of banking transfers could not affect the outcome because the paragraph 4 reasons independently justified refusal.
7. The judicial review claim was refused.

The judgment was a first-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. The claim was issued in the Upper Tribunal and later referred to the High Court. Permission was refused on the papers by HHJ Bidder QC on 20 February 2019, but granted at an oral hearing by UTJ Grubb sitting as a judge of the High Court on 27 March 2019.