Dyer, R (On the Application Of) v

Inquest screens are lawful only where the statutory precondition is met and the coroner then exercises a separate discretion. The discretion requires a balancing exercise that gives particular weight to open justice, including the public’s and bereaved family’s interest in seeing witnesses give evidence. The quality of evidence and genuine witness fears are important, but neither is conclusive. Objective justification for the feared risk must also be assessed. Screens should be ordered only where necessary and to the extent necessary.

The claimant, the partner of a man who died shortly after being restrained in police custody, challenged directions by the Assistant Coroner for West Yorkshire that 16 police officers give evidence from behind screens. The screens prevented the public and the deceased’s identified family members from seeing the officers, although the family’s legal representatives could see and question them.

The challenge alleged misdirection, irrationality, incompatibility with common-law fairness and breach of the procedural duties under articles 2 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The central issue was whether the coroner had lawfully balanced the officers’ safety and the quality of their evidence against open justice and effective family participation.

1. Ground 1 succeeded. The coroner misdirected himself in law. Rule 18(2) of the Coroners (Inquests) Rules 2013 creates a necessary condition for screening: the coroner must determine that screens are likely to improve the quality of the evidence or allow the inquest to proceed more expeditiously. That condition is not sufficient by itself. Rule 18(1) confers a further discretion.
2. In exercising that discretion, the coroner must consider all the circumstances and conduct a balancing exercise. The fundamental principle of open justice must have a place in the decision and receive appropriate weight. The relevant interest includes the public’s and the family’s interest in seeing witnesses who may be implicated in a death give evidence, as well as the importance of public confidence in the inquest.
3. The improvement of evidence caused by relieving genuine witness fears is a material and potentially weighty factor. It is not conclusive. The coroner must also consider whether the fears are objectively justified, the likelihood of the feared risk occurring, the effect on effective questioning, and whether the proposed restriction is necessary and proportionate. The availability of cross-examination is relevant but does not by itself answer the open-justice issue.
4. The coroner’s binary balancing exercise, which weighed improved evidence against the effectiveness of questioning, failed adequately to consider open justice and the objective risk that the family would identify officers and breach the anonymity orders. The conclusion that the feared disclosure might occur was speculative on the evidence.
5. Even absent the legal misdirection, the decision was irrational to the extent that it prevented the identified family members from seeing the officers. The directions could properly continue for officers C and N. The screening directions were quashed to that extent. Ground 4 and the distinct Article 2 and fairness arguments were unnecessary to decide. The assumed Article 3 argument did not alter the result because anonymity was already granted and the further risk relied on was speculative.

First-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. The court quashed the screening directions only to the extent that they prevented the identified family members from seeing the officers; screening remained applicable to officers C and N.