Chelfat v Chaudhry's Restaurant Ltd

On an appeal from an assessment of damages, the appellate court should respect the trial judge’s advantage in hearing the evidence. It may interfere where the assessment applies a wrong legal principle or is seriously wrong, including by placing the injury outside the appropriate guideline bracket. The Judicial College Guidelines ordinarily provide the relevant current scale, and a judge need not discuss individual comparable cases where the Guidelines have been considered. For a litigant in person, the costs cap is assessed by reference to the hypothetical costs of a legal representative doing the same work, not simply by applying a percentage to the amount claimed. Where the evidence and findings permit, the appellate court may reassess damages and costs itself rather than remit the matter.

The claimant succeeded in a personal injury claim against the defendant restaurant after suffering food poisoning. Judgment had been entered in her favour on liability, leaving damages and costs to be assessed.

HHJ Roberts assessed general damages at £6,500, past financial loss at £300, interest and costs at £2,750. The claimant appealed, arguing that her injuries fell within a higher category in the Judicial College Guidelines and that the costs cap had been applied incorrectly. The High Court granted permission and heard the substantive appeal.

1. Appeal allowed. The assessment of damages and the costs order were wrong and the Order was varied.
2. The appellate court’s task was a review under CPR 52.21, not a rehearing. Interference with an assessment of damages required a wrong principle of law or an assessment that was seriously wrong. The judge’s factual advantage was respected, but the written and medical evidence could be assessed directly where appropriate.
3. The claimant’s unchallenged evidence supported classification under paragraph (b)(ii), rather than paragraph (b)(iii), of Chapter 6G of the Judicial College Guidelines. The severity of the initial food poisoning, the duration of gastrointestinal symptoms and the aggravation of pre-existing depression, anxiety and panic attacks justified an award at the lower end of the higher bracket. General damages were reassessed at £10,000. The court held that it was sufficient for the judge to have regard to the Guidelines; he was not required to mention individual cases.
4. The Guidelines represented the current scale for non-pecuniary loss. Separate inflationary adjustment was generally unnecessary. The approach was consistent with Cookson v Knowles [1977] QB 913 (CA).
5. Under CPR 46.5(2), the litigant-in-person cap was to be assessed by reference to the costs that a hypothetical legal representative would have incurred for the same work, not by reference merely to the claimant’s own total claim. Costs of £4,440, including the medical report, were awarded, together with the costs of the appeal.
6. Under CPR 52.20, it was more efficient for the High Court to reassess the damages and costs itself than to remit the matter to the County Court.

• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): Appeal from the order of HHJ Roberts dated 16 January 2019. Permission to appeal was granted at the rolled-up hearing, and the appeal was allowed. The order was varied.