A City Council v A Mother & A Father & Ors (Care Proceedings Radicalisation)

In care proceedings involving risks arising from parental support for violent extremism, a care order may be necessary and proportionate even where children remain living at home. The court must assess the risks to welfare, apply the least interventionist approach consistent with welfare, consider the local authority’s permanency plan and take account of the statutory welfare checklist. A supervision order may be inadequate where the local authority requires powers to regulate the exercise of parental responsibility and protect the children’s education, social development and emotional welfare. Public law proceedings may exceptionally continue after a child reaches 17 where they serve a practical protective purpose, although no care or supervision order can then be made. The inherent jurisdiction may be used to protect such a child from significant harm where the statutory conditions and permission requirements are satisfied.

The local authority brought care proceedings concerning four children aged 17, 12, nine and seven, after police investigations identified material indicating support for terrorism and violent extremism within the family. The parents agreed threshold facts establishing a risk of significant physical, emotional and developmental harm to the younger children. The younger children remained living at home under interim arrangements, while the court considered whether final care orders or supervision orders were appropriate.

The court had previously determined in Re Q (Interim Care Order: Jurisdiction) [2019] EWHC 512 (Fam) that public law orders could not be made once a young person reached 17, but permitted the proceedings concerning Q to continue. The central issues were the welfare and proportionality of care orders for the younger children and whether protective relief under the inherent jurisdiction was appropriate for Q.

1. Outcome. The court found the threshold under section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 satisfied on the agreed facts. Final care orders for A, B and C were approved in principle, with final orders to be made after resolution of the police disclosure application.
2. Necessity and proportionality. The court had to prefer the least interventionist order consistent with welfare, consider the permanency provisions of the local authority’s plan under section 31(3), and take account of the factors in section 1 of the Act. A care order was nevertheless necessary and proportionate because the children remained exposed in the family home to serious emotional and developmental risks arising from the parents’ radicalised beliefs and the influence of an older sibling.
3. Care order rather than supervision order. A supervision order could not adequately mitigate the risks because it lacked the powers required to regulate, in consultation with the parents, the exercise of parental responsibility. The local authority needed the powers under sections 33(3) and 33(4), particularly in relation to education, social integration, internet use and exposure to extremist material. The written agreement with the parents, including engagement with Prevent, electronic-device monitoring and restrictions on travel, was approved.
4. Q. Although Q was 17 and could no longer be made subject to a public law order, the proceedings could properly continue where they had practical utility. Q remained a child in need under section 17(1) until 18. Under the inherent jurisdiction, the court authorised an order holding her passport until her 18th birthday. The requirements in sections 100(4) and 100(5) were satisfied because there was reasonable cause to believe that Q was likely to suffer significant harm without the order, and the desired protection could not be achieved through an order for which the local authority was otherwise entitled to apply.