Jasieniewicz v District Court In Wroclaw-Fabryczna, Poland

For the purposes of Extradition Act 2003, a requested person may be treated as deliberately absent from trial where his own conduct led to his being unaware of the trial date and place, including conduct which put it beyond the authorities’ ability to notify him. The assessment focuses principally on the person’s conduct rather than a separate inquiry into subjective intention. Where the European arrest warrant is clear and contains the necessary statements, the extradition court need not seek further information or conduct an independent investigation. If voluntary absence is established, the further statutory inquiry into the adequacy of retrial rights is unnecessary. Delay remains relevant to the proportionality assessment under Article 8 ECHR, but does not necessarily prevent extradition.

The appellant appealed under s.26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against District Judge Zani’s decision of 8 April 2019 ordering his extradition to Poland to serve a sentence of two years and six months. Permission was granted on two grounds: whether he had deliberately absented himself from the trial and had adequate retrial rights under s.20, and whether extradition was compatible with Article 8 ECHR and s.21.

The central issues were whether the judge had properly assessed deliberate absence, whether further information was required, and whether the Article 8 balancing exercise was legally adequate.

1. Appeal dismissed. Neither ground of challenge was made out.
2. Under s.20 of the Extradition Act 2003, the District Judge was entitled to find that the appellant had deliberately absented himself from his trial. The relevant question was whether his own conduct led to his being unaware of the trial date and place by putting it beyond the Polish authorities’ ability to notify him. The assessment focused on his conduct rather than requiring a separate finding of subjective intention.
3. The finding was supported by the appellant’s knowledge of the allegations and pre-trial proceedings, his representation during those proceedings, his acknowledged obligation to notify the authorities of changes of address, his failure to do so, his receipt of court notification, and his unsupported assumption that the proceedings had ended. His failure to keep the authorities informed meant that further specification of the summons or hearing details would have made no material difference.
4. The European arrest warrant was not ambiguous. Applying the approach in Cretu v Romania [2016] EWHC 353 (Admin), the extradition court was not required to press the judicial authority for further information or conduct an independent investigation into matters sufficiently stated in the warrant. The mutual-trust basis of the European arrest warrant system remained relevant.
5. Because the appellant had voluntarily absented himself, consideration of the additional retrial safeguards under s.20(5) and s.20(8) was unnecessary. Although the respondent accepted that the warrant did not appear expressly to guarantee all of those safeguards, that issue did not affect the outcome.
6. For Article 8 and s.21 purposes, the overall period of delay was a relevant factor. The District Judge had nevertheless considered the appellant’s family life, employment, accommodation, financial support, his child’s interests, and the circumstances concerning his residence in the United Kingdom. The balancing exercise applied the correct legal principles. The additional witness statement concerning his partner’s reduced income would not have altered the result.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal under s.26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against District Judge Zani’s decision of 8 April 2019 was dismissed.
• Permission stage: Whipple J granted permission to appeal on the s.20 deliberate-absence and retrial-rights issues, and on the Article 8 and s.21 proportionality issue.