UUU v BBB (Rev 1)

Threatening to disclose potentially lawful or truthful information can amount to blackmail where disclosure is used as unwarranted pressure to obtain a financial advantage. Truth is no defence to blackmail or harassment. For interim relief, the claimant must show that success at trial is more likely than not, subject to the court’s power to preserve the position where appropriate. A bare undertaking not to harass or blackmail is insufficient where the underlying threat remains operative. The restraint must identify clearly the conduct prohibited and may continue until trial where there is a continuing risk of oppressive disclosure.

The claimant sought continuation of an interim injunction granted under section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The injunction restrained the defendant from disclosing personal information about the claimant to business associates and others. The threatened disclosures had been linked to demands for a share in companies or a monetary settlement of a contractual dispute.

The defendant denied blackmail and harassment, relied on the alleged truth of the information, and argued that the injunction impaired his ability to pursue the contractual dispute. The central issues were whether the threats were likely to constitute blackmail or harassment and whether interim restraint should continue pending trial.

1. The interim restraint was extended until the final hearing, subject to removal of paragraphs (h) and (i) of confidential schedule 2.

2. The claimant was more likely than not to establish at trial that the defendant’s emails constituted blackmail contrary to section 21 of the Theft Act 1968. The elements were present: demands for financial gain, menaces consisting of threatened disclosure, and demands that were unwarranted because the threatened disclosures were not a proper means of reinforcing the contractual demands.

3. The fact that the information might be true, or might lawfully be disclosed in another context, did not prevent the threats from being menaces or provide a defence to blackmail. The court applied Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] AC 797 and relied on ZAM v CFW [2013] EMLR 27 and LJY v Persons Unknown [2017] EWHC 3230 (QB).

4. The threatened publication was also likely to constitute harassment under sections 1(1) and 1(3) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The conduct was deliberate, had caused significant alarm, fear and distress, and threatened further substantial distress. Truth was no defence to harassment.

5. Blackmail substantially reduced the weight accorded to freedom of expression and supported restraint to prevent crime and preserve the claimant’s position. A bare undertaking not to harass or blackmail did not remove the threat where the defendant refused to undertake not to disclose the identified information. The defendant remained able to pursue the separate contractual claim.

6. The untested allegation that the claimant had lied, and the claimant’s communications to a small number of investors about the injunction, did not justify refusing interim relief.