Otuo v The Watch Tower Bible And Tract Society of Britain (Relief from Sanctions 1)

Relief from sanctions requires application of the three-stage Mitchell/Denton approach. The court must assess the seriousness and significance of the breach, consider its reasons, and then evaluate all the circumstances, giving particular weight to efficient and proportionate litigation and compliance with court orders. A serious default without a good reason may nevertheless justify relief where refusal would impair the efficient resolution of an important issue before trial. An order may contain an implied sanction that prevents an interim application being heard, while leaving the underlying pleaded defence available for determination at trial.

The defendants sought relief from sanctions under CPR 3.9 after serving notice and a skeleton argument four days late, contrary to paragraph 19(b) of an order made by HHJ Parkes QC. The documents related to an application concerning the justiciability of the claimant’s slander claims.

The delay deprived the claimant, who was acting in person, and the court of preparation time. The court considered whether the order contained an implied sanction, whether the application was in substance for an extension of time after expiry, and whether relief should be granted. A separate default arose from both parties’ failure to exchange witness statements by the ordered date.

1. The Parkes Order contained an implied sanction. If the specified documents were not served in time, the defendants’ application could not be heard before trial. The underlying pleaded defence of non-justiciability remained available for determination at trial.
2. Alternatively, the defendants were seeking variation of an expired time limit. Under R (Hysaj) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 1633, reported at [2015] 1 WLR 2472, they therefore had to satisfy the criteria for relief from sanctions.
3. The applicable process was the three-stage Mitchell/Denton approach. The court first assessed whether the breach was serious or significant. If so, it considered the reasons for the breach. If there was no good reason, it considered all the circumstances, giving particular weight to the need for efficient and proportionate litigation and compliance with rules, practice directions and orders under CPR 3.9.
4. The defendants’ nine-day delay was serious and significant. The order created a clear and carefully structured timetable. The defendants failed to seek a variation, failed to appreciate the effect of their delay on the claimant’s preparation, and caused substantial inconvenience to the court. Their willingness to accommodate difficulties affecting the claimant did not provide a sufficient explanation.
5. Despite those findings, relief was granted. Refusal would postpone an issue concerning the court’s power and competence to adjudicate and would risk requiring it to be addressed at trial. Resolving, or at least fully arguing, the issue before trial was more likely to serve the overriding objective than refusing relief solely to enforce compliance.
6. The failure by both parties to exchange witness statements on 14 January was minor and inconsequential, with an acceptable explanation. Relief was granted to both parties in respect of that default, and the court proceeded to hear the justiciability application.

First-instance decision. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.