Pilarczyk v Regional Court In Poznan, Poland & Ors

Section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 requires the court to decide whether extradition, rather than the trial itself, would be unjust or oppressive because of delay. Injustice primarily concerns prejudice to the ability to receive a fair trial; oppression concerns hardship caused by changed circumstances. The court must consider safeguards available in the requesting state, particularly where it is bound by the European Convention on Human Rights. Unexplained delay does not automatically establish culpability. All the circumstances must be considered, including the seriousness of the alleged offences, personal and family hardship, and any actual trial prejudice. The appeal was dismissed because neither injustice nor oppression was established.

The appellant appealed against a Westminster Magistrates’ Court order dated 23 April 2019 directing his extradition to Poland under two European Arrest Warrants. The alleged frauds occurred in March and April 2006. The appellant had lived and worked in the United Kingdom since 2007 and relied on the passage of time, possible loss of documents, delay in issuing and certifying the warrants, and the effect of extradition on his family life.

The district judge had wrongly treated him as a fugitive in relation to the relevant warrants. The High Court therefore considered whether the error required discharge under section 27(3) of the Extradition Act 2003, and whether new evidence required that result under section 27(4).

The appeal was dismissed. Although the district judge had wrongly treated the appellant as a fugitive in relation to the second and third European Arrest Warrants, the error did not affect the outcome.

1. Injustice. Section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 concerns whether extradition would be unjust, not whether the trial itself would be unjust. The court adopted the distinction in Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [2978] 1 W.L.R. 779: injustice is directed primarily to prejudice in conducting the trial, while oppression concerns hardship arising from changed circumstances.

2. The court had to take account of safeguards under Polish domestic law and of Poland’s obligations under article 6 of the ECHR. The Polish courts could determine whether relevant documents existed and whether a trial without them would be unfair. There was no sufficient basis to conclude that extradition itself would be unjust.

3. Oppression. The appellant’s twelve-year life in the United Kingdom, close family relationships and the hardship caused by extradition were relevant. They did not, however, make extradition oppressive. The alleged offences involved multiple frauds and possible imprisonment. They were serious, although not among the most serious offences.

4. Delay must be assessed in context. The court declined to infer culpable delay merely because the issuing and certification of the warrants took substantial time. Following La Torre v The Republic of Italy [2007] EWHC 1370 (Admin) and Oreszczynski v Krakow District Court [2014] EWHC 4346, culpable delay requires that something ought to have been done sooner and that there is no good explanation. Even assumed culpable delay would not have altered the conclusion on these facts.

5. The new evidence was fully considered but would not have led to a different decision. It was therefore unnecessary to determine whether all of it was unavailable at the original hearing. The conditions in section 27(3) and section 27(4) were not satisfied.

The appeal was dismissed. There was no order for costs, save for detailed assessment of the appellant’s publicly funded costs.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against the Westminster Magistrates’ Court order dated 23 April 2019 was dismissed.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: Ordered extradition to Poland under the relevant European Arrest Warrants.