HML PM Ltd v Canary Riverside Estate Management Ltd & Anor

An interim injunction affecting freedom of expression requires the claimant to satisfy section 12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998. A tribunal-appointed manager’s appointment is personal to the individual appointed. The manager’s employer does not thereby acquire standing to restrain use of information obtained through the manager’s official role. Another person’s legal professional privilege cannot generally be used as a sword to obtain relief where the claimant has no independent right. Prior dissemination, public interest, delay and failures in an ex parte application may also weigh against relief.

HML PM Ltd sought an interim injunction against Canary Riverside Estate Management Ltd and Octagon Overseas Ltd, restraining use of documents said to have been obtained from a stolen laptop or hacked email account. The documents concerned the management of the Canary Riverside Estate and included material claimed to be confidential and subject to litigation privilege.

Alan Coates, an employee and director of HML, had personally been appointed by the First-tier Tribunal as manager under section 24 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987. The central issues were whether HML had standing, whether privilege could support the claim, and whether relief should be granted despite prior dissemination, public-interest arguments and procedural delay. The application was later withdrawn, but judgment was handed down because the issues had potential general importance.

1. Application dismissed. The claimant withdrew the application, but the court handed down judgment because the case raised points of potential general interest and the judgment was substantially complete.
2. Because the relief might affect freedom of expression, section 12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 required HML to show that it was more likely than not to establish at trial that publication would not be allowed. This included showing a sufficient standing to complain of breach of confidence.
3. HML failed to establish standing. The First-tier Tribunal appointed Mr Coates personally as manager. References to him as being “of” HML identified him and did not appoint HML. His ability to delegate work to HML employees made them his agents. His power to litigate in his own name and personal responsibility to the Tribunal reinforced that conclusion.
4. The principle in Fraser v Evans applied: the person entitled to enforce confidence is the person to whom the duty is owed and who can decide whether, and to whom, the information may be disclosed. HML’s association with Mr Coates did not give it that power in relation to documents exclusively concerning his tribunal appointment.
5. Privilege did not supply the missing standing. A person other than the privilege-holder may sometimes assert privilege as a shield against compelled disclosure, but HML sought to use another person’s privilege as a sword. The court rejected that basis for relief and also rejected the wider claims of litigation and common-interest privilege.
6. The court expressed further views. Prior distribution did not automatically defeat an injunction unless the dissemination was so extensive that relief would serve no further purpose. Public interest might have justified a tailored exception for use before the tribunal or court deciding the allegations, but not general dissemination. Delay, failure to issue the claim promptly and shortcomings in the earlier ex parte presentation would also have been formidable discretionary obstacles.

Not an appeal. The application was initially made without notice, was not substantively granted, and was later re-presented on notice before the High Court. The claimant subsequently withdrew the application and discontinued the underlying claim.