Thomas & Anor v Bulathwela & Anor

Where legal title to property is held by one person, the claimant must establish an equitable interest by proving, on the evidence as a whole, an inferred common intention or, if that is inconclusive, a resulting trust arising from contributions to the purchase price. Mortgage payments do not ordinarily establish a beneficial interest unless they are referable to an agreement or arrangement made when the property was acquired. An appellate court will not interfere with factual findings that were reasonably open to the trial judge. A litigant in person is not generally entitled to a lower standard of compliance with procedural rules. Fresh evidence on appeal must satisfy the established requirements of reasonable diligence, probable material influence and apparent credibility.

This was an appeal from the County Court at Central London concerning the beneficial ownership of a property registered solely in the name of the first respondent, who was bankrupt. The appellant, her husband, claimed a beneficial interest based on resulting or constructive trust principles and relied on evidence concerning the deposit, mortgage payments and a charge granted to the Legal Services Commission.

The district judge rejected the claim and declared that the trustees in bankruptcy were the sole legal and beneficial owners. The appeal raised the correctness of that conclusion, the exclusion of further evidence, and an application to adduce new evidence and obtain a retrial.

1. Appeal dismissed. On the evidence admitted below, the finding that the appellant had no beneficial interest in Whitchurch Lane was plainly within the range of reasonable findings open to the district judge.
2. The parties agreed that the proper approach was first to ask whether the evidence as a whole established an inferred common intention that beneficial ownership was shared. Only if the evidence was insufficient to reach a conclusion was it necessary to consider a presumption of resulting trust arising from contributions to the purchase price. The court therefore declined to determine the alleged inconsistency between Marr v Collie [2018] QC 631 and Laskar v Laskar [2008] 1 WLR 2695.
3. There was no admissible evidence of a contribution by the appellant to the purchase price. Mortgage payments made from 2015 were, on the evidence, assistance to the daughter who was paying the mortgage in lieu of rent. They were not referable to an agreement made when the property was purchased and did not establish a resulting trust. The charge granted to the Legal Services Commission did not, without evidence explaining why the appellant executed it, establish a beneficial interest.
4. The challenge to the factual findings failed. An appellate court should not interfere where the findings were supported by the evidence and were reasonably open to the trial judge. The order excluding further evidence was also upheld. The appellant had failed to comply with directions, had given no adequate explanation for the delay, and his status as a litigant in person did not justify a lower standard of compliance.
5. The application to adduce fresh evidence was refused. Applying the principles in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489, the evidence could reasonably have been obtained for trial, was not sufficiently compelling, and was not likely to have an important influence on the result. A retrial would also prejudice the respondents and other court users.

• High Court (Chancery Division): appeal from the County Court at Central London dismissed. The district judge’s declaration that the trustees were the sole legal and beneficial owners of Whitchurch Lane was upheld.
• Permission to appeal: granted by Snowden J on a limited basis concerning whether the appellant had a beneficial interest in Whitchurch Lane. Permission to adduce fresh evidence was refused.