Hnus v Nyiregyhaza District Court (Hungary)

Section 12 of the Extradition Act 2003 does not bar extradition merely because the requested person has previously been convicted of an offence involving the same document. The court must examine whether the offences concern the same or substantially the same criminality. Material differences in the conduct, time, location and aspect of criminality may prevent double jeopardy from arising. A sentencing judge’s reference to the document’s origin does not necessarily mean that the offender was sentenced for the separate conduct forming the extradition offence.

A European Arrest Warrant sought the applicant’s extradition from the United Kingdom to Hungary for allegedly abetting a public official to issue a false passport. The applicant had previously pleaded guilty in the Crown Court to possessing the passport with improper intention, contrary to section 4(1) and (2) of the Identity Documents Act 2010.

The District Judge rejected objections based on section 12 and Article 3 ECHR and ordered extradition. Permission to appeal was sought on the section 12 and Article 3 issues. This judgment determined the section 12 ground and adjourned the Article 3 ground pending an application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court in related proceedings.

1. Section 12 and double jeopardy. The applicant’s extradition was not barred under section 12 of the Extradition Act 2003. The Hungarian offence concerned alleged abetting of a public official to falsify an administrative document. The United Kingdom conviction concerned subsequent possession of that document with improper intention.
2. The offences involved materially different conduct, occurring at different times and in different locations. They also addressed separate aspects of criminality: corruption or abetting forgery in Hungary, and use of the passport in the United Kingdom to establish personal information and obtain a national insurance number.
3. The Crown Court sentencing remarks did not establish that the applicant had been sentenced for abetting the passport’s issue. The reference to the passport having been obtained from the Hungarian authorities acknowledged the nature of the document. The reference to R v Ovieriakhi concerned the level of criminality involved in using a false passport, understood in the context explained by R v Carneiro.
4. The wider abuse-of-process form of double jeopardy did not assist the applicant. A prosecution in the Crown Court for abetting forgery would not have been liable to be stayed because it would concern a separate and serious aspect of criminality. Dar v Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt am Main was materially different on its facts and did not require a different result.
5. The further information from the Hungarian authorities was admissible because it confirmed a factual finding made below. It also indicated that the Hungarian position was not inconsistent with the United Kingdom approach. Permission to appeal on the section 12 ground was refused.
6. The Article 3 ground was adjourned pending the Supreme Court’s decision on permission to appeal in Szalai & Zabolotnyi v Hungarian Judicial Authorities.

1. District Judge Coleman: rejected objections under section 12, section 12A, section 21A(1)(a) and Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, and ordered extradition.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): refused permission to appeal on the section 12 issue and adjourned the Article 3 issue pending related Supreme Court proceedings.