Medhurst v Vale of Glamorgan Billing Authority

An appellate tribunal commits procedural unfairness amounting to an error of law where, after hearing the evidence, it refuses a party a reasonable opportunity to make closing submissions, particularly where the submissions could address disputed factual findings and the parties’ final positions.

On an appeal on a point of law, factual findings and factual evaluations are primarily for the tribunal. The High Court may interfere only where the conclusion is unsupported by the evidence, a demanding threshold. Whether a person lives in a dwelling is a factual issue; substantial unfurnishment does not determine that question.

Karen Medhurst appealed under regulation 44 of the Council Tax tribunal regulations against a decision of the Valuation Tribunal for Wales dated 30 May 2019. The Tribunal had rejected her case that premises in Barry qualified for a Class C council tax exemption between 6 October 2011 and 5 April 2012, and a Class C discount between 6 April 2012 and 1 July 2013.

The central issues were whether the property was substantially unfurnished and whether Mrs Medhurst lived there as her sole or main residence. The Tribunal found the property substantially unfurnished but concluded that she had lived there during the relevant periods. The appeal principally concerned whether the Tribunal’s refusal to hear closing submissions was procedurally unfair and amounted to an error of law.

1. Appeal allowed. The refusal to permit closing submissions was procedurally unfair and amounted to an error of law. Mrs Medhurst had no opportunity to respond to the Council’s case, address matters arising from the evidence, or draw together the factual conclusions she said the Tribunal should reach.
2. The Tribunal’s stated reasons—that it had sufficient material and a thorough understanding of the parties’ positions—were inadequate. Without closing submissions, the Tribunal could not safely assume that it understood the parties’ final positions after the evidence and questioning had concluded. Closing submissions can be particularly important where the decision turns on factual evaluation. The opportunity to participate fairly in proceedings has value independent of the quality of the ultimate decision.
3. The Tribunal’s decisions on the Class C exemption and Class C discount were therefore set aside and the issues were remitted for reconsideration by a differently constituted tribunal.
4. The remaining grounds did not alter the result. The 2017 amendment regulations concerned the Class B discount, had prospective effect, and could not affect periods before July 2013. Any errors by the Council before the Tribunal’s decision were not errors of law by the Tribunal and had not been adopted by it.
5. Whether the property was substantially unfurnished and whether Mrs Medhurst lived there as her sole or main residence were questions of fact or factual evaluation. The Tribunal was the primary fact-finder. The High Court could interfere only where the conclusion was unsupported by evidence, which was a high threshold. The informal departmental letter was not statutory guidance and did not determine the interpretation or application of the governing legislation.
6. The decision in R v D [2019] EWCA Crim 209, concerning the absence of a legal duty to notify a council tax authority of a person’s residence, did not govern the Tribunal’s separate evidential task of deciding whether Mrs Medhurst lived at the property. Conversely, R (Williams) v Horsham District Council [2004] 1 WLR 1137 supported the proposition that a person cannot be resident in a dwelling unless they actually live there.
7. The Tribunal had also failed to indicate whether it admitted or rejected a late statement from Mrs Medhurst’s father. That omission was unsatisfactory, although it was not separately categorised as an error of law. The statement could be considered at the rehearing.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Appeal allowed against the Valuation Tribunal for Wales decision dated 30 May 2019. The Tribunal’s decisions on the Class C exemption and discount were set aside and remitted to a differently constituted tribunal for rehearing.