United Cabbies Group (London) Ltd, R (On the Application Of) v Westminster Magistrates' Court

A licensing court must decide whether an applicant is a fit and proper person at the time of its decision. It may then grant a licence for a shorter period and impose conditions, but it has no power to grant a provisional or probationary licence applying a different test. A judgment must be read as a whole; an omitted formula does not establish a misdirection where the reasoning shows that the correct test was applied. Apparent bias requires a real possibility of bias assessed by a fair-minded and informed observer. Unknown facts cannot have influenced a judge, and there is no general duty to investigate the business connections of family members. Remote or tenuous connections do not establish presumed or apparent bias.

Transport for London refused to renew Uber London Ltd’s London private hire vehicle operator’s licence, finding that Uber was not a fit and proper person under the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998. On appeal, the Chief Magistrate granted a 15-month licence, concluding that Uber had become fit and proper and imposing conditions.

United Cabbies Group (London) Ltd sought judicial review. It argued that the Chief Magistrate had unlawfully granted a probationary licence without finding that Uber was fit and proper at the date of decision, and that the decision was vitiated by presumed or apparent bias arising from her husband’s indirect commercial connections. The central issues were whether the statutory test had been applied and whether the circumstances created a real possibility of bias.

1. Statutory test. The claim was dismissed. Under section 3(3)(a) of the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998, the court had to be satisfied that Uber was a fit and proper person at the time of the hearing. The statutory power to grant a shorter licence and impose conditions arose only after that conclusion had been reached.
2. The Chief Magistrate’s judgment, read as a whole, showed that she understood and applied the statutory test. Her statement that Uber had provided evidence that it was then fit and proper, followed immediately by the grant of the licence, plainly conveyed acceptance of that evidence. The reference to a probationary licence described the practical significance of the conditions and limited duration; it did not show that a different legal test had been applied.
3. Presumed bias. Automatic disqualification requires a direct pecuniary or proprietary interest. A family member’s interest is attributed to the judge only where the connection is so close and direct that it is, for practical purposes, indistinguishable from the judge’s own interest. The indirect link between remuneration received by the judge’s husband’s consultancy and an investment in Uber’s parent company was too tenuous and contingent.
4. Apparent bias. The applicable question was whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. The judge did not know of the relevant link between the investor and Uber when she heard the appeal. That absence of knowledge dispelled any possible influence from the alleged connection.
5. There was no general duty requiring a judge to investigate whether family members or companies connected with them had indirect associations with parties. Such a duty would impose an unnecessary and onerous burden and was unsupported by authority. The additional alleged connections, individually and cumulatively, remained too remote to establish bias. The claim was dismissed.

The judgment does not state a prior appellate stage. The proceedings were judicial review proceedings challenging the decision of the Chief Magistrate, who had granted Uber a 15-month licence.