Shrimpton v Bar Standards Board

An appeal from a disciplinary tribunal is a review, not a rehearing. A tribunal may treat a criminal conviction as conclusive in disciplinary proceedings, subject to the requirements of natural justice and exceptional circumstances. A person seeking to go behind a conviction must identify significant fresh evidence or other exceptional circumstances. Re-running arguments and evidence available at the criminal trial, or relying on material that could have been raised on appeal, will ordinarily be insufficient. The tribunal may take account of unsuccessful appeals and the assessment of the Criminal Cases Review Commission. A consent order permitting evidence about exceptional circumstances does not necessarily confer a right to reopen the criminal case in full.

Mr Shrimpton appealed against his disbarment following two criminal convictions. The disciplinary charges relied on the convictions, subject to the Bar Standards Board rules concerning their evidential effect and the qualification required by natural justice.

A previous tribunal had made an order by consent permitting him to serve evidence relevant to exceptional circumstances. The later tribunal considered whether that evidence justified going behind the convictions and permitting a full reconsideration of his innocence. It concluded that the threshold was not met. The central issues were the proper interpretation of the consent order and whether the tribunal’s refusal to hear the proposed evidence made its decision wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural irregularity.

1. The appeal was dismissed. Under section 24(6) of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 and CPR Part 52.21, the appeal was a review of the tribunal’s decision. It could succeed only if that decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity.

2. The tribunal was entitled to proceed on the basis that the convictions were conclusive for the disciplinary proceedings, subject to natural justice. The relevant qualification permitted the tribunal to go behind a conviction only where exceptional circumstances were shown. The policy identified in Shepherd v The Law Society [1996] EWCA Civ 977 and applied in Michael Stannard v General Council of the Bar supported refusing a collateral challenge to a criminal conviction save in exceptional circumstances.

3. The consent order did not give Mr Shrimpton an unrestricted right to re-run the criminal trials. It permitted him to adduce evidence directed to persuading the tribunal that the exceptional-circumstances threshold was met. The tribunal had correctly construed and applied the order.

4. The tribunal was entitled to consider that the convictions had followed trials, unsuccessful appeals and, in relation to relevant material, consideration by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. Evidence which had been available at trial, or arguments about its admissibility which could have been pursued on appeal, did not ordinarily amount to exceptional circumstances. The tribunal was also entitled to find that the fourth report relied on was neither clear nor persuasive and to refuse the opportunity for further evidence.

5. General Medical Council v Spackman [1943] AC 627 did not establish a general duty on regulators to conduct a wholly fresh inquiry after a criminal conviction. Its conclusion depended on the wording of the governing statute and the distinction between a criminal conviction and a disciplinary allegation requiring due inquiry.

1. High Court (Administrative Court) — Appeal against the Disciplinary Tribunal’s decision dismissing the challenge to disbarment. The appeal was dismissed.